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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court fail to properly instruct
the jury on the legal duty owed by a possessor of land to a
business invitee to warn the invitee about hazardous conditions to be encountered on the land?
2. Did the court fail to instruct the jury about
the legal definition of "unreasonable risk" as stated in
Section 343/ Restatement of Torts, Second?

in

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Nature of the Case
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict of no cause
of action against the defendant and from a denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
Disposition of Case in Lower Court
A jury trial was held in this case on October 2 and
3 1984, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding.

The jury

was given instructions prepared by the Court asking whether
the defendant was negligent in his operation of a waterslide
on which plaintiff was injured.
given itf
negligent.
Plaintiff
denied.
1984.

the jury concluded

Based on the instruction

that the defendant was not

Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant.
requested

a new

trial

in the case which was

An order to that effect was entered on December 14,

An appeal was filed on January 7, 1985.
Statement of Facts
On June 21, 1982 plaintiff Walter Wagoner, family

members and some friends went to the Burchcreek Waterslide
in Ogden, to use the waterslide facilities. Mr. Wagoner had
never before ridden a waterslide.

Shortly after arriving at

the facility he cut the tendon of his right great toe when
his foot went out over the top of the waterslide as he came
out of a turn and contacted an unfinished roughened, outer
edge of the fiberglass waterslide.
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At the time of his

injury he was using the waterslide in a proper recommended
fashion by sliding on his chest on a rubbermat provided by
the facility for that purpose.
The
construction.

waterslide

itself

was

of

fiberglass

The top of the waterslide was open.

It had

been manufactured and installed in 1979 and in operation
each summer thereafter.
When

the

waterslide

components

were

originally

manufactured there was a rounded edge at the top of the
waterslide which flared out into an unfinished edge of rough
fiberglass on each outer edge of the fiberglass sections.
(R.29, Exhibits 2P, 3P, 4P and 5P) When the components were
assembled into the complete waterslide the rough, unfinished
edge

of

fiberglass

extended

the

entire

length

of

the

waterslide along both outer edges of the slide.
At the top of the waterslide is an entry pool from
which access is gained to the slide itself.

There is a

splash pool at the bottom of the waterslide. (R.440)

Water

flowing down the interior of the waterslide has two functions.

First it moistens the fiberglass so a person can

slide; secondly it acts to slow a person down by creating a
wave of water in front of the slide user which acts as a
brake. (R. 440) If the water is prevented from flowing down
the slide, leaving only the moist fiberglass, a rider will
reach a higher speed. (R.441)
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Also, a smaller person will

not generally go down the slide as fast as a larger person
(R.442) and if several riders join together to form a train
they will likewise increase their speed down the waterslide.
(R.443)

In this case, plaintiff Walter Wagoner was 6 f 3^"

tall and weighed 250 lbs. when injured so he would automatically have gone down the waterslide faster than a normal
sized man. (R.443-444)
As a person goes through the curves of a waterslide
their momentum propels them upward on the outer edge of the
slide as they go through a turn.

(R.444-445)

In factf if

their speed becomes too great through the curves they can
literally

pop

waterslide.

right
This

out

had

of

the

occurred

Burchcreek Waterslide. (R.447)

top
once

of

this

previously

Rind

of

at the

As a person goes through a

turn his arms or legs automatically come in closer proximity to the exposed, unfinished edge of the waterslide with a
greater potential for getting cut if an arm or leg extends
over the top curved edge of the slide.
The

exposed

edge of

this waterslide, on which

plaintiff was cut, is about four inches from the curved top
of the waterslide. (R.432 and 437)

It was not uncommon for

riders to grab the upper, curved edge to slow down (R.437)
So it was clearly known and expected that riders arms or
legs would routinely be within four inches of the exposed
outer edge of rough fiberglass. (R. 437).
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The trial testimony of defendant Neal Citte concerning

the danger

presented

by the outer

edge of the

waterslide is important for purposes of this appeal.
Q. But that edge, if a person were sliding
down the waterslide and in motion and a portion of their body—arm, fingers, feet,
whatever—came in contact with that unfinished edge, it has the capacity to cut
them?
A.

Yes.

(R. 432)

Mr. Hasenyager: Q. All right. So at least
with hands, it is foreseeable that someone
would have fingers within four inches of
this unfinished edge that Mr. Wagoner was
cut on?
A.

Ifve already answered that, yes.

Q. All right. I think then you would agree
Mr. Citte, would you not, that that
roughened edge is dangerous if a person
comes in contact with it?
A. Yes.
Q. And its dangerous of course because a
person could get cut?
A.

Yes. (R. 439-440)

Q.
All right. Now, the answer that you
gave me of bordering up the sides too far
and actually making it so your body might
protrude out of the slide, its a hazard that
was known in the use of the waterslide if a
person got going fast enough?
A. When you say it was a hazard that was
known, I rode the slide before and you know,
on anything there's limitations and there's
a point you don't feel safe, but when. . . .
I rode the slide, I felt there was a point
of being safe and unsafe.
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Q. All right. Let's talk about the point
where a person becomes unsafe riding the
slide.
Where a person becomes unsafe is
when the speed builds up far enough that
they rise up to the wall and they are put in
close proximity to this roughened edge where
they can become cut, isnft that true?
A.

That's true.

Q.
So one of the dangers of this slidef
which is Known to you as the owner, was that
the roughened edge. The outside edge posed
a danger to sliders who come in proximity
with it?
A. That's why we told them not to hold the
water back. (R.448-449)

Q. All right. But as
you've already told
roughened, that it was
sidred it so, and that
slide, right?
A.

Yes.

a parallel to that,
us that edge was
dangerous, you conis a hazard of the

(R.450)

Q. Now Mr. Citte, when a person is riding
the waterslide—you've seen a lot of people
go down that slide, haven't you?
A.

Fair share.

Q.
Okay.
There are times when an inexperienced person could lose control of their
arms or legs as they go through the curbes,
aren't there? Is's fair to say that could
happen?
A. It
person
their
you're

would be fair to say an inexperienced
could lose control.
When you say
arms or legs would protrude like
trying to infer—

Q. Well, I haven't said that. My question
is only that they could lose control of
where their arms or legs are, isn't that
true?
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A.

I guess it's possible, sure.

Q.
And in fact, that's not an uncommon
thing either is it? People hit those curves
and they'll—their arms will go one direction and/or their feet or another arm may go
up over that edge. That's not uncommon?
A, No, I wouldn't —when you say it's not
uncommon, I've seen it happen, sure.
Q. You've seen it happen, you knew it does
happen from time to time.
A. Sure.
Q.

It's an expected occurrence, right?

A.

It can happen, sure.

Q.
Okay.
In those curcumstances where
somebody loses their control of their arms,
their arms could go all different directions
and the same with their legs, isn't that
true?
A.

I imagine,

Q. Okay. That is a known and expected circumstance in riding the waterslide, isn't
it?
A.

It's happened.

Q. Okay. And that can happen when a person is riding the slide correctly without
holding the water back, can't it?
A.

I think it could happen (R.458-459)

Q. All right. And the third question is
that you never warned any of the users of
the waterslide about a risk or hazard of
getting cut if their arms or legs protruded
out over that edge?
A.

No.

(R.460)
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Q. So you1re not meaning to imply that the
average rider or the first-time rider, like
Mr. Wagoner wasf would look at that edge and
a light would go on in his head and he'd say
you know, better keep my arms and legs in
because I could get cut; you're not implying
that, are?
A.

No, I have not implied that. (R. 495)

From the excerpts of Mr. Citte's testimony cited
above it is clear that Mr. Wagoner was injured in a foreseeeable manner when his foot came into contact with a
dangerous condition of the waterslide, known to exist by the
slide owner, who

had

not warned

slide users about the

hazard.
It was the defendant's contention at trial that
because no one had been previously injured in a similar
fashion the risk of injury was not unreasonable and he
therefore had no legal duty to warn users about the hazard,
nor any responsibility to guard the hazard or remove it.
The trial court then prepared its own special verdict

jury

instructions

which

contained

the

following

interrogatory number 1:
Do you find it proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant was negligent
in the manner in which he used the slides
with the edge as it was and did he expose the
plaintiff to an unreasonable rish of injury?
(R.351)
The interrogatory was followed by an explanation
prepared by the trial judge.

(R. 351-352)
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Plaintifffs Objections were taken to the courts
proposed instruction (R. 498-503) and in partinent part were
made primarily because the explanations given in conjunction
with the first interrogatory did not inform the jury that
the defendant had an affirmative duty to, at a minimum, warn
slide users of known hazards they would encounter in using
the waterslide.

Also, the jury was given no guidance as to

the legal definition of "unreasonable risk" nor the factors
to be considered in determining whether or not a risk was
unreasonable.
Summary of Argument
The jury was improperly insturcted on the law concerning the duty of a possessor of land to a business invitee because they were not informed that the possessor of
land has an affirmative duty to warn invitees about hazardous conditions they will encounter on the land in circumstances where the hazard it not obvious and the jury was
not instructed about the nature of an unreasonable risk.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE DUTY OWED BY THE POSSESSOR OF
LAND TO A BUSINESS INVITEE TO WARN THE
INVITEE ABOUT HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS TO BE
ENCOUNTERED ON THE LAND.
Section 343, Restatement of Torts, Second States:
§ 343.
Dangerous Conditions Known to or
Discoverable by Possessor.
A possessor of land is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he
-8-

a)
Knows or by the exercise of reasonable
care would discover the condition, and should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk
of harm to such invitees, and
b) should expect that they will not discover
or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
The comment notes to Section 343 in pertinent part
say that the invitee on land
• . . He is entitled to expect such care not
only in the original construction of the premises, and any activities of the possessor or
his employees which may affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover
their
actual
condition
and
any
latent
defects, followed by such repair, safeguards,
or warning as may be reasonably necessary for
his protection
under
the circumstances,
(emphasis added)
. . . To the invitee the possessor owes not
only this duty, but also the additional duty
to exercise reasonable affirmative care to
see that the premises are safe for the reception of the visitor, or at least to ascertain
the condition of the land and to give such
warning that the visitor may decide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation, or may protect himself against the
danger if he does accept it.
(emph a sis
added)
It is clear

from the language of the Restatement

Comments that once a possessor of land knows of a dangerous
condition on the land he must, at a minimum, give the invitee a warning about the hazard if he chooses not to remove
or guard against the hazard.
This was the precise holding
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in Odell v. Cook's

Market, Inc., 432 S.W. 2d 382 (Mo. App. 1968).

The plain-

tiff fell in a store when she slipped on a mixture of water
and lettuce or cabbage leaves.

The Court cited Section 343

of the Restatement and said that the defendant had "the
alternate duty either to remove the wet leaves that created
the dangerous condition or warn Mrs. O'Dell of the dangerous
condition that existed on the floor."
This case is significant for two reasons.

First,

dangerous condition is used synonymously with unreasonable
risk of harm, the specific language of Section 343. i.e. a
dangerous condition creates an unreasonable risk of harm
unless corrected or warned about.

Secondly, it recognizes

the affirmative nature of the duty to remove the dangerous
condition or warn about it.
affirmative duty of care.

Either conduct fulfills the

Ignoring the dangerous condition

does not.
In the instruction given by the trial court in this
case, the affirmative duty to warn slide users about a known
dangerous condition was ignored by the court.

Also, the

court simply asked the two part question was the defendant
negligent in his use of the slide with the edge as it was
and did the defendant expose plaintiff to an unreasonable
risk of injury.
If there does actually exist an affirmative duty
under

Section

343

to

warn

slide
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users

about

a

known

dangerous condition then the defendant was negligent as a
matter of law in this instance because he clearly knew of
the hazard and failed to warn plaintiff or anyone else about
the hazard.
If the issue of negligence must be analyzed from
the standpoint of whether the risk was unreasonable before
the minimum duty to warn about a known dangerous condition
arises then the instruction given by the court was still
inadequate because it did not define unreasonable risk.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ABOUT THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF UNREASONABLE
RISK OR THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
DECIDING
WHETHER
OR
NOT
A
RISK
IS
UNREASONABLE.
Under Section 291, Restatement of Torts, Second a
risk is unreasonable and the act (or here omission) negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what
the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.

In determining the uti-

lity of the act under Section 292, Restatement of Torts,
Second there must be some social value advanced or protected
by leaving an unfinished, roughened fiberglass edge on the
waterslide when that edge had the recognized capacity to
cause injury if contacted.

Or, some particular social value

in failing or justifying the failure to warn slide users
about the edge so they could take reasonable steps to pro-
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tect themselves from contracting the edge if they chose to
use the waterslide.
It is difficult to see any utility or social value
of any kind that would justify or excuse the failure to warn
in this instance.

The defendant attempted

at trial to

excuse

to warn

the

his

failure

patrons

about

edge by

testifying that over a million rides had taken place down
the waterslide without anyone previously being cut like
plaintiff.

That, of course, is not a complete test of uti-

lity or social value in this case.
defendant

had

any

public

or

The test is whether the

private

interest

that was

advanced or protected by failing to warn about the hazardous
condition.

It includes the magnitude of the risk, the

possible extent of harm or injury that might result to a
user and a consideration of individual and societal rights
and obligations.

i.e. is there any social utility or value

in exposing slide users to the risk of injury by being cut
on

a

known, dangerous, unfinished,

waterslide.

edge

of

the

Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 703 F. 2d

921, 924 (1983).
(1977).

outer

Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W. 2d 759, 770

When a known hazard is present that could be easily

warned about there is no possible public or private interest
belonging

to

the

defendant

which

was greater

than the

general public interest in having waterslide users ride the
waterslide free of injury or at a minimum with full disclo-
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sure of the risks involved in use of the waterslide so they
could intelligently decide whether or not to accept the risk
and use the waterslide anyway.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above plaintiff request that
the court order a new trial in this case.
DATED this

An

day of April, 1985.
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

tfil^

S*b

rames R. Hasenyage^
CERTIFlgATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on thiis
April, 1985, I mailed

4 true

day of

//>_

and correct

copy of the

foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Roger H.
Bullock,

Attorney

for

Respondent,

Sixth

Floor

Boston

Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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Ch. 13

CONDITION AND USE OF LAND

§ 343

k. Where learning inadequate: JThere will, however, be
special situations in which the possessor has knowledge of facts
from which he should realize that an ordinary warning will not
be sufficient to notify the licensee of the danger, or to enable
him to protect himself against it. Thus where the possessor
knows that the licensee is blind, illiterate, or a foreigner, or a child
too young to be able to read, it is not enough to rely upon a
posted notice to give warning of the danger, and the possessor
may still be required to exercise reasonable care to give adequate
warning in some other way. In extreme cases, as in the case of
the blind man, he may even be required to give physical assistance
to enable the licensee to avoid the danger.
I. Dangers known to licensee. The licensee, who enters
land with no more than bare permission, is entitled to nothing
more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers which he
will encounter if he comes. If he is warned of the actual conditions, and the dangers involved, or if he discovers them for
himself without such warning, and fully understands and appreciates the risk, he is in a position to make an intelligent
choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is sufficient to
justify him in incurring the risk by entering or remaining.
Therefore, even though a dangerous condition is concealed and
not obvious, and the possessor has given the licensee no warning, if the licensee is in fact fully aware of the condition and
the risk, there is no liability to him.

TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS
OF LAND TO INVITEES
§ 3 4 3 . Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by
Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land
if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves
against it, and
B— Appendix lor Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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Ch. 13

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. This Section should be read together with § 343 A,
which deals with the effect of the fact that the condition is
known to the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact
that the invitee is a patron of a public utility. That Section
limits the liability here stated. In the interest of brevity, the
limitation is not repeated in this Section.
6. Distinction between duties to licensee and invitee. One
who holds his land open for the reception of invitees is under
a greater duty in respect to its physical condition than one who
permits the visit of a mere licensee. The licensee enters with
the understanding that he will take the land as the possessor
himself uses it. Therefore such a licensee is entitled to expect
only that he will be placed upon an equal footing with the possessor himself by an adequate disclosure of any dangerous conditions that are known to the possessor. On the other hand an
invitee enters upon an implied representation or assurance that
the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his reception. He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor will
exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry,
or for his use for the purposes of the invitation. He is entitled
to expect such care not only in the original construction of the
premises, and any activities of the possessor or his employees
which may affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover
their actual condition and any latent defects, followed by such
repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary
for his protection under the circumstances.
As stated in § 342, the possessor owes to a licensee only the
duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to him dangerous
conditions which are known to the possessor, and are likely not
to be discovered by the licensee. To the invitee the possessor
owes not only this duty, but also the additional duty to exercise
reasonable affirmative care to see that the premises are safe for
the reception of the visitor, or at least to ascertain the condition
of the land, and to give such warning that the visitor may decide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation, or may
protect himself against the danger if he does accept it.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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343

As stated in § 342, the possessor is under no duty to protect the licensee against dangers of which the licensee knows
or has reason to know. On the other hand, as stated in § 343 A,
there are some situations in which there is a duty to protect an
invitee against even known dangers, where the possessor should
anticipate harm to the invitee notwithstanding such knowledge.
c. As to invitees who go beyond the scope of the invitation, as to either time or place, see § 332, Comment I.
d. What invitee entitled to expect. An invitee is entitled
to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain
the actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it,
either to make it reasonably safe by repair or to give warning
of the actual condition and the risk involved therein. Therefore
an invitee is not required to be on the alert to discover defects
which, if he were a mere licensee, entitled to expect nothing but
notice of known defects, he might be negligent in not discovering.
This is of importance in determining whether the visitor is or
is not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to discover
a defect, as well as in determining whether the defect is one
which the possessor should believe that his visitor would not
discover, and as to which, therefore, he must use reasonable care
to warn the visitor.
e. Preparation required for invitee. In determining the
extent of preparation which an invitee is entitled to expect to
be made for his protection, the nature of the land and the purposes for which it is used are of great importance. One who
enters a private residence even for purposes connected with the
owner's business, is entitled to expect only such preparation as
a reasonably prudent householder makes for the reception of
such visitors. On the other hand, one entering a store, theatre,
office building, or hotel, is entitled to expect that his host will
make far greater preparations to secure the safety of his patrons
than a householder will make for his social or even his business
visitors. So too, one who goes on business to the executive
offices in a factory, is entitled to expect that the possessor will
exercise reasonable care to secure his visitor's safety. If, however, on some particular occasion, he is invited to go on business
into the factory itself, he is not entitled to expect that special
preparation will be made for his safety, but is entitled to expect
only such safety as he would find in a properly conducted factory.
/. Appliances used on land. A possessor who holds his
land open to others must possess and exercise a knowledge of the
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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dangerous qualities of the place itself and the appliances provided therein, which is not required of his patrons. Thus, the
keeper of a boardinghouse is negligent in providing a gas stove
to be used in an unventilated bathroom, although the boarder
who is made ill by the fumes uses the bathroom with knowledge
of all the circumstances, except the risk of so doing. This is
true because the boardinghouse keeper, even though a man of
the same class as his boarders, is required to have a superior
knowledge of the dangers incident to the facilities which he
furnishes to them.
g. As to the duty of a possessor of business premises to
protect his invitees from harm threatened thereon by third persons, see § 344.
§ 3 4 3 A« Known or Obvious Dangers
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact
that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or
of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. The rule stated in this Subsection applies to all persons
who enter or remain on land in the capacity of invitees, as defined
in § 332. It includes in particular the patrons of a public utility
who enter land in its possession seeking its services, to which as
members of the public they are entitled; and it includes members
of the public making use of the land of the government or a government agency which is held open for the use of the public. As
is stated in Subsection (2), such a public utility, government,
or government agency may have special reason to anticipate that
one who so enters will proceed to encounter known or obvious
dangers; and such a defendant may therefore be subject to liability in some cases where the ordinary possessor of land would
not.
See Appendix for Reporter 8 Notes, Court Citations, and Cross Reference*
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prior positions and courses of movement of
the injured pedestrian and the defendant
motorist. Those crucial factors distinguish the cited cases from ours. Here, the
evidence is more akin to the cases of Davis
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 316
S.W.2d 494 [8, 9] ; Wapelhorst v. Lindner,
Mo., 269 S.W.2d 865 [7, 8 ] ; Hartlage v.
Halloran, Mo.App., 331 S.W.2d 197 [3].
In each, plaintiff lost by failing to show the
relative prior positions and courses of travel of the plaintiff pedestrian and the defendant motorist. We reach the same result
here.
We hold that the plaintiff failed to make
a submissible humanitarian case. The trial
court correctly set aside plaintiff's verdict
and judgment and entered judgment for the
defendants. That judgment should be affirmed.
P E R CURIAM:
The foregoing opinion of CLEMENS, C ,
is adopted as the opinion of this court. Accordingly, the judgment for defendants is
affirmed.
ANDERSON, p f j . , RUDDY, J., and P.
F. PALUMBO, Special Judge, concur.

IUMIEV SYSTEM>

resulting when invitee slipped on wet cabbage or lettuce leaves in defendant's store.
The Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, J.
Casey Walsh, J., sustained defendant's motion for judgment in accordance with his
motion for directed verdict and appeal was
taken. The Court of Appeals, Ruddy, J.t
held that since invitee was aware of the
dangerous condition defendant was not liable for failure to warn invitee of condition,
and invitee, who had observed and been
warned by mother of condition 30 minutes
prior to fall, was not distracted and was
not prevented from seeing condition at
time of fall in well-lighted store, was cont r i b u t o r y negligent.
Affirmed.

I.^Negligence <§=»48, 52
A landowner is liable for bodily harm
caused an invitee by a natural or artificial
condition on the land if landowner knows,
or with use of reasonable care should
know, of condition which, if known, would
cause landowner to realize it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to invitees,
landowner has no reason to believe invitees
will discover condition or realize risk, and
landowner invites or permits invitees to remain without exercising reasonable care to
remedy the condition or warn invitees.
2. Negligence <§=48

Audrey Ann O'DELL and Paul O'Dell,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
COOK'S MARKET, INC., Defendant,
Respondent.

Basis of landowner's liability to invitee
is superior knowledge of an unreasonable
risk of harm of which the invitee, in exercise of ordinary care, does not or should
not know of.
3. Negligence <£=>52

No. 32914.
St. Louis Court of Appeals.
Missouri.
Sept. 17, 1968.

Action by invitee and her husband to
recover for invitee's injuries and husband's
medical expenses and loss of consortium

A 2

Landowner must warn invitee of existing conditions on the land which involve
an unreasonable risk of harm, but he need
not make repeated warnings.
4. Negligence <§=>50, 52
Storekeeper had duty either to remove
wet leaves that created dangerous cond»*
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tjon or to warn invitee of dangerous condition, but not both.
5. Negligence <§=>48
Only when a dangerous condition on
the premises is known to the landowner
a n d not known to invitee who is injured, is
a recovery permitted.
$. Negligence €=>66(l)
There is no liability of landowner for
injuries from dangers that are obvious, or
as well known to person injured as to landowner.
7. Negligence <§=>66(l)
}l Invitee, who slipped on wet cabbage or
lettuce leaves in store where lighting was
good, she was not distracted, she had seen
the condition and been warned by her
mother that it was dangerous 30 minutes
"previous to fall and she was not prevented
from seeing the dangerous condition at
time of fall, was contributory negligent.
8. Negligence <S=>69
t?~, Forgetfulness, when nothing has occurred to distract the mind, does not excuse ^ negligence based on knowledge of
Joangerous condition.
JkNegligence <S>69
( ^ A s s u m i n g invitee who fell on wet cab' wge or lettuce leaves in store forgot that
j&e had observed and been warned by her
ifjgjfcer of the condition 30 minutes pre'-St?^.* 0 ^ » forgetfulness was not ex*»ed where nothing occurred to distract in-

j | * f B. Marglous, Clayton, for plain"Ppellants.
**r, Marsalek, Carpenter, Cleary &
St. Louis, for defendant-respond-

RUDDY, Judge.
Audrey Ann O'Dell, wife of Paul O'Dell
was injured when she slipped and fell in
defendant's store on either lettuce or cabbage leaves mixed with water. She and
her husband jointly brought this action.
She to recover damages for her injuries
and he to recover for medical expenses and
loss of consortium. A jury trial resulted
in a verdict in favor of the wife in the
sum of $1500 and in favor of the husband
in the sum of $500. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for judgment in
accordance with its motions for a directed
verdict filed by it at the close of all of the
evidence and entered a judgment in favor
of defendant against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
appeal.
Mrs. O'Dell went to the store of the defendant in an automobile driven by her
husband. Mr. O'Dell remained in the
automobile and Mrs. O'Dell, her young son
and her mother entered the store about
8:00 P.M. on June 16, 1965. It was the intention of Mrs. O'Dell and her mother to
shop for their respective needs. Each procured a cart in which to put her purchases.
There were not many customers in the
store that evening. Mrs. O'Dell and her
mother shopped through the various meat
and grocery departments of the store as
well as at the vegetable counter. Mrs.
O'Dell did not believe that she purchased
any of the vegetables. There were no customers in the vegetable department when
they passed through. As they got to the
vegetable counter in the course of their
shopping tour Mrs. O'Dell noticed that the
floor was wet in spots and that it had debris which she described as either lettuce
or cabbage leaves. It covered an area of
one square foot. At that time she saw the
manager of the store and a clerk in the
vegetable department. The mother of Mrs.
O'Dell testified that she told her daughter
to " 'be careful' * * * 'it looks kind of
messy in there.'" Her daughter did not
respond to this admonition or say anything
to her. Mrs. O'Dell testified that she did
not remember her mother saying anything

to her and that she said nothing to her
mother about the presence of the leaves and
water on the floor at the time they first
went through the vegetable department.
Mrs. O'Dell was wearing a pair of low flat
heeled shoes. She testified that the lighting was adequate and that she had no trouble seeing where she was going. About
thirty minutes after she and her mother
left the vegetable area they arrived at the
checkout counter of the store where a
clerk would compute the sum owed for the
purchases made. While her mother's purchases were being computed Mrs. O'Dell
remembered that she wanted to purchase
an avocado for salad. She gave her mother her purse and told her to set it on the
mother's cart while she went back to get
the avocado. As she was going through
the vegetable department on her way to get
the avocado she slipped and fell. She testified, "I slid and I fell." Her leg folded
under her and she fell in a sitting position.
She testified that she knew she had fallen
on something because she went down "too
fast." After she had fallen she looked
back from her sitting position to see what
she had fallen on and she noticed a skid
mark "that was either lettuce, or cabbage,
mixed with water," and noticed some of
the mixture on her left shoe. She described it as a green, slimy substance. She
said it was all over the bottom of the sole
of her left shoe. While she was sitting on
the floor she saw a boy picking up leaves
from the floor. He was about twelve to
eighteen feet in front of her. When Mrs.
O'Dell failed to return to the checkout
counter her mother told Mrs. O'Dell's son
to go back and see what happened to the
mother. Upon learning from the boy of her
daughter's fall she went to her daughter's
assistance. She described the area at the
time as "sort of damp, and a few little
greens on the floor." The mother thought
the condition of the floor was about the
same as the first time she and her daughter
went through the vegetable department
She saw what she described as lettuce on
her daughter's left foot and that her daughter's slim jims were all green and wet

":eer zl^i zzxo the store picked up Mrs.
O ' l t l — carried her out to the automor l t I r D'Dell testified that when he
!>Di-e~ — ~e floor he noticed it was wet
and =cx i "ertuce leaf clinging to the sole
of bir 7-f*"s shoe. He noticed one of the
yorrr z^ctry clerks picking vegetable
leare^ ~zz : : the floor. He said the light~ r " - " - r - g in the store were adequate
a: tne —c and he had no difficulty seeing
wher^ z=. Tras going. He said the store
VET T^I lighted. Mrs. O'Dell testified
rhsr xzzzz sit returned to the vegetable deparrr^r: zz obtain the avocado she observer zz employees or customers in the
V?PT.- - department and when asked if
there T^T scything to distract her she answers ~> j . " When asked if there was
ary " r zz prevent her from seeing the
\tzzzzt "eaves on the floor if she had
loostz 25 answered that she was not looking- n: ^ e floor at the time but said there
wa= zzzzzzzz to prevent her from seeing the
Iemce js-res on the floor had she looked.
The r e a r e r of the store testified that between f±een and thirty minutes before he %
\ezrzszz zz Mrs. O'Dell's fall he was in the
r f r ? - * area for the purpose of helping
azszzTz^Zz and checking supplies. He said
he -*-££ have checked to see whether or
no: ±ere was any debris on the floor. It
was :ne :£ his responsibilities to look after
the ssfs. He was told by one of the
cleris zzzz Mrs. O'Dell had fallen and he
wen zz There she had fallen and said he
looifiiirhe floor and saw nothing.
The zzzzsz was submitted to the jury ott
the alepd ground that defendant failed to
use trzrary care to remove the wet let*
tuce rr rabbage leaves on the floor after &
kneir zz could have known of the unsafe
coarrrr and that Mrs. O'Dell did not
knc*r szd could not have known of the tn*~
safe zznlrSon of the floor.
P l r r r f s contend that the trial corf
errei zz setting aside the jury verdict #
fare? cf the plaintiffs and entering a JQ<*
mem =: favor of the defendant because tf*
evizerce shows that defendant had ciw^
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tual or constructive notice of the condif the floor and was negligent in pertion 0
t t i n g the wet leaves to remain on the
flnor f ° r a P e n ° d of thirty minutes and
f rther contends that Mrs O'Dell vvas not
contnbutonly negligent as a matter of law
* failing to remember the presence of the
. e s 0 n the floor, which she had preuS u observed thirty minutes prior there,
Defendant contends that her knowl~?£e of the condition of the floor and her
"conduct in failing to avoid it constitutes
contributory negligence as a matter of law
n_3] Defendant admits that
Mrs
O'Dell was an invitee who was injured on
Its premises The Supreme Court m the
case of Harbourn v Katz Drug Company,
Mo*, 318 S W 2d 226, 74 A L R 2d 938 has
"«ven the applicable rule go\ ernmg liability
to an invitee It said (1 c 228, 229)
* the rule as to defendants' duty
and liability to one in such status (mvi^ tee), as stated in 2 Restatement, Law of
feTorts, § 343, is as follows 'A possessor
C o i land is subject to liability for bodily
llliarni caused to business visitors by a
fenatural or artificial condition thereon if,
|U>ut only if, he (a) knows, or by the exs^ erase of reasonable care could discover,
s^the condition which, if known to him, he
^should realize as involving an unreasonajisk to them, and (b) has no reason
Jo ^believe that they will discover the
idition or realize the risk invohed
^tfarein, and (c) invites or permits them
^remain upon the land without exercisIJ&reasonable care ( I ) to make the conlon reasonably safe, or (n) to give a
ing adequate to enable them to
Td the harm * * *.' "
s t oasis of defendant's liability is its su* ^ W knowledge of an unreasonable risk
of which the invitee, m the exerordinary care, does not or should
Harbourn v Katz Drug Com'-**pra, 1c 229 However, m order
'dant to fulfill its duty to plaintiff
w i t e e it need not make repeated

warnings Harbourn v Katz Drug Comp a n y supra, 1 c 231
[4-6] Also, defendant had only the alternate duty either to remove the wet
lea\es that created the dangerous condition
or to warn Mrs O'Dell of the dangerous
condition that existed on the floor
Defendant did not have the duty to both remove the leaves from the floor and to
warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition
If defendant warned plaintiff of the condition or if plaintiff had the same knowledge
of the condition as defendant there would
be no liability on the part of defendant
Liability of an owner or occupant of premises is predicated on the owner or proprietor's superior knowledge of the dangerous
condition and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the premises It is only
when the dangerous condition is known to
the owner or occupant of the premises and
not known to the person injured, that a recovery is permitted It follows therefore
that there is no liability by the owner or
occupier of the premises for injuries from
dangers that are obvious, or as well known
to the person injured as to the owner or occupant Lamberton v Fish, Mo , 148 S W.
2d 544,1 c 546
[7] In the instant case Mrs O'Dell on
her first trip past the vegetable counter
thirty minutes before she fell saw that the
floor was wet and that it had debris which
she described as either lettuce or cabbage
leaves on it She said it covered an area
of one square foot, her mother warned
her to " 'be careful/ " telling her, " 'it looks
kind of messy in there ' " Mrs O'Dell did
not deny that her mother warned her, she
merely testified that she did not remember
her mother saying anything to her State
ex rel and to Use of Williams v Feld
Chevrolet, Inc , Mo App , 403 S W 2d 672,
683 The fact is that Mrs O'Dell did admit that she saw the wet leaves on the
floor and was fully aware of the dangerous condition of the floor at that time
While the evidence m this case does not
show that defendant warned Mrs. O'Dell

to her and that she said nothing to her
mother about the presence of the leaves and
water on the floor at the time they first
went through the vegetable department.
Mrs. O'Dell was wearing a pair of low flat
heeled shoes. She testified that the lighting was adequate and that she had no trouble seeing where she wras going. About
thirty minutes after she and her mother
left the vegetable area they arrived at the
checkout counter of the store where a
clerk would compute the sum owed for the
purchases made. While her mother's purchases were being computed Mrs. O'Dell
remembered that she wanted to purchase
an avocado for salad. She gave her mother her purse and told her to set it on the
mother's cart while she went back to get
the avocado. As she was going through
the vegetable department on her way to get
the avocado she slipped and fell. She testified, "I slid and I fell." Her leg folded
under her and she fell in a sitting position.
She testified that she knew she had fallen
on something because she went down "too
fast" After she had fallen she looked
back from her sitting position to see what
she had fallen on and she noticed a skid
mark "that was either lettuce, or cabbage,
mixed with water," and noticed some of
the mixture on her left shoe. She described it as a green, slimy substance. She
said it was all over the bottom of the sole
of her left shoe. While she was sitting on
the floor she saw a boy picking up leaves
from the floor. He was about twelve to
eighteen feet in front of her. When Mrs.
O'Dell failed to return to the checkout
counter her mother told Mrs. O'Dell's son
to go back and see what happened to the
mother. Upon learning from the boy of her
daughter's fall she went to her daughter's
assistance. She described the area at the
time as "sort of damp, and a few little
greens on the floor." The mother thought
the condition of the floor was about the
same as the first time she and her daughter
went through the vegetable department.
She saw what she described as lettuce on
her daughter's left foot and that her daughter's slim jims were all green and wet.

Thereafter, Mrs. O'Dell's husbana wno naa
been called into the store picked up Mrs.
O'Dell and carried her out to the automobile. Mr. O'Dell testified that when he
looked at the floor he noticed it was wet
and saw a lettuce leaf clinging to the sole
of his wife's shoe. He noticed one of the
young grocery clerks picking vegetable
leaves off of the floor. He said the lighting conditions in the store were adequate
at the time and he had no difficulty seeing
where he was going. He said the store
was well lighted. Mrs. O'Dell testified
that when she returned to the vegetable department to obtain the avocado she observed no employees or customers in the
vegetable department and when asked if
there was anything to distract her she answered "No." When asked if there was
anything to prevent her from seeing the
lettuce leaves on the floor if she had
looked she answered that she was not looking on the floor at the time but said there
was nothing to prevent her from seeing the
lettuce leaves on the floor had she looked.
The manager of the store testified that between fifteen and thirty minutes before he
learned of Mrs. O'Dell's fall he was in the
vegetable area for the purpose of helping
customers and checking supplies. He said
he would have checked to see whether or
not there was any debris on the floor. It
was one of his responsibilities to look after
the aisles. He was told by one of the
clerks that Mrs. O'Dell had fallen and ht
went to where she had fallen and said h<
looked at the floor and saw nothing.
The cause was submitted to the jury o*
the alleged ground that defendant failed t<
use ordinary care to remove the wet let
tuce or cabbage leaves on the floor after i
knew or could have known of the unsaf
condition and that Mrs. O'Dell did nc
know and could not have known of the ur
safe condition of the floor.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial cou
erred in setting aside the jury verdict :
favor of the plaintiffs and entering a judf
ment in favor of the defendant because tf
evidence shows that defendant had eith«

iviAJK,is^T, INC.
Cite as 432 S. W.2d

ctual or constructive notice of the condition of the floor and was negligent in permitting the wet leaves to remain on the
floor for a period of thirty minutes and
further contends that Mrs. O'Dell was not
contributorily negligent as a matter of law
• failing to remember the presence of the
leaves on the floor, which she had previously observed thirty minutes prior thereto. Defendant contends that her knowledge of the condition of the floor and her
conduct in failing to avoid it constitutes
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
h
[1-.3] Defendant admits that Mrs.
O'Dell was an invitee who was injured on
its premises. The Supreme Court in the
case of Harbourn v. Katz Drug Company,
Mo., 318 S.W.2d 226, 74 A.L.R.2d 938 has
given the applicable rule governing liability
to an invitee. It said (I.e. 228, 229):
' "* * * the rule as to defendants' duty
, » and liability to one in such status (invi•r t tee), as stated in 2 Restatement, Law of
^ Torts, § 343, is as follows: 'A possessor
H. of land is subject to liability for bodily
ft, harm caused to business visitors by a
s'j% natural or artificial condition thereon if,
^ but only if, he (a) knows, or by the ex^ v ercise of reasonable care could discover,
|jx the condition which, if known to him, he
Ij^should realize as involving an unreasonajj&j{ble risk to them, and (b) has no reason
g ^ t p believe that they will discover the
^ c o n d i t i o n or realize the risk involved
^therein, and (c) invites or permits them
Ipto remain upon the land without exercis^ing reasonable care (i) to make the conedition reasonably safe, or (ii) to give a
gnvarning adequate to enable them to
^avoid the harm * * *.'"
pUie basis of defendant's liability is its sulor knowledge of an unreasonable risk
| J n a r m of which the invitee, in the exeriJp* of ordinary care, does not or should
E S C ^ o w . Harbourn v. Katz Drug Comt> supra, I.e. 229. However, in order
^defendant to fulfill its duty to plaintiff
I*11 invitee it need not make repeated
«32 S.W.2d—25
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warnings. Harbourn v. Katz Drug Company, supra, I.e. 231.
[4-6] Also, defendant had only the alternate duty either to remove the wet
leaves that created the dangerous condition
or to warn Mrs. O'Dell of the dangerous
condition that existed on the floor. Defendant did not have the duty to both remove the leaves from the floor and to
warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition.
If defendant warned plaintiff of the condition or if plaintiff had the same knowledge
of the condition as defendant there would
be no liability on the part of defendant.
Liability of an owner or occupant of premises is predicated on the owner or proprietor's superior knowledge of the dangerous
condition and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the premises. It is only
when the dangerous condition is known to
the owner or occupant of the premises and
not known to the person injured, that a recovery is permitted. It follows therefore
that there is no liability by the owner or
occupier of the premises for injuries from
dangers that are obvious, or as well known
to the person injured as to the owner or occupant. Lamberton v. Fish, Mo., 148 S.W.
2d 544,1. c. 546.
[7] In the instant case Mrs. O'Dell on
her first trip past the vegetable counter
thirty minutes before she fell saw that the
floor was wet and that it had debris which
she described as either lettuce or cabbage
leaves on it. She said it covered an area
of one square foot; her mother warned
her to " 'be careful,'" telling her, " 'it looks
kind of messy in there.'" Mrs. O'Dell did
not deny that her mother warned her, she
merely testified that she did not remember
her mother saying anything to her. State
ex rel. and to Use of Williams v. Feld
Chevrolet, Inc., Mo.App., 403 S.W.2d 672,
683. The fact is that Mrs. O'Dell did admit that she saw the wet leaves on the
floor and was fully aware of the dangerous condition of the floor at that time.
While the evidence in this case does not
show that defendant warned Mrs. O'Dell

dou

of the condition of the floor, nevertheless,
defendant is not liable for failure to warn
Mrs. O'Dell because it was shown that
Mrs. O'Dell had knowledge of the dangerous condition of the floor. She saw its
dangerous condition thirty minutes before
she fell. The source of the knowledge of
Mrs. O'Dell is immaterial. The important
fact is that she had as much knowledge of
the condition as defendant had or was
charged with. Trautloff v. Dannen Mills,
Inc., Mo.App., 316 S.W.2d 866, 871. The
lighting conditions were good; there were
no customers in the vegetable department
at the time Mrs. O'Dell fell and there was
nothing to prevent her from seeing an obviously dangerous condition which she had
observed thirty minutes earlier.
Mrs.
O'Dell was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law.
However, Mrs. O'Dell seeks to escape
the accusatory nature and effect of this
knowledge by stating in her brief that she
failed to remember the presence of the
leaves on the floor when she returned to
get the avocado thirty minutes later.
[8,9] The fact is that Mrs. O'Dell never did testify that she failed to remember or
forgot about the presence of the leaves on
the floor. No such testimony was ever
given by her; but assuming, without so
stating, that Mrs. O'Dell did forget, the
rule of law in this state is that forgetfulness, when nothing has occurred to distract
the mind, does not excuse. Clark v. Missouri Natural Gas Co., Mo., 251 S.W.2d 27,
I.e. 30. In the case of Harbourn v. Katz
Drug Co., supra, at page 231, the Supreme
Court said: "It is unquestionably correct,
and properly so, that generally an invitee
who is aware of a dangerous condition
cannot impose liability on the possessor of
property because he momentarily forgot
about it and was injured. Lamberton v.
Fish, supra; 38 Amjur., Negligence, §
187; Annotation, 39 L.R.A.,N.S., 896."
The court further said: "'Circumstances
may exist under which forgetfulness or inattention to a known danger may be con-

sistent with tne CACI^-V .
as where the situation requires one to give
undivided attention to other matters, or is
such as to produce hurry or confusion, or
where conditions arise suddenly which are
calculated to divert one's attention momentarily from the danger.' 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 120, pp. 726-727."
Were the circumstances in this case sufficient to excuse Mrs. O'Dell's forgetfulness, if in fact she did forget? She did
not testify that she was in a hurry, nor
was there anything to show that a condition arose suddenly which was calculated
to divert her attention. She did not say
that she was unaware of the location of
the avocadoes. She did not say that she
was focusing her attention on the vegetable
stand. She did testify that there were no
customers in the vegetable department at
.that time and that there was nothing to
distract her and that she could have seen
this condition on the floor, which was one
foot square in area, had she looked. We
find nothing in the evidence that was calculated to divert Mrs. O'Dell's attention
from the obviously dangerous condition of
the floor. No circumstances were shown
to exist which would excuse her forgetfulness or inattention to the danger confronting her. Plaintiffs cite the case of Stocker
v. J. C. Penney Co., Mo.App., 338 S.W.2d
339 in support of their position. The facts
in that case may be distinguished from the
facts of the instant case. In that case
plaintiff saw a small dark object about the
size of a plum as she was descending the
steps of the store on the first trip dowr
the steps and after a considerable shoppin'
tour of the store that lasted approximate!
one hour and a half, she again descende
the same steps and stepped in and wc
caused to fall by the deposit of gum on tr
stairway which had been on said step fc
at least one hour and a half. In t!
Stocker case plaintiff testified that si
was not thinking of the spot as she c
scended the steps, stating that it had, "ji
slipped my mind." We upheld the juc
ment in favor of plaintiff pointing out ti
the defect or condition was not of sucl
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striking nature as would likely produce a
lasting effect upon the mmd of one observing !t - ^ n ^ e m s t a n t c a s e ^ e condition
that caused Mrs O'Dell's fall was a glaringly dangerous condition. A much shorter period of time elapsed between the time
Mrs O'Dell saw it and the time of her fall
than existed m the Stocker case. Also
Mrs O'Dell testified that she was not distracted.

agreement was for 12 units for $6,500 with
tentative plans for two additional units
where contractor's petition was based on
contract and sought money judgment and
mechanic's hen of $8,003 09 for work and
materials furnished at builder's request,
without specifying any number of units.

We rule the trial court was correct in
directing a judgment for the defendant.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed

Rule that a party is entitled to all evidence in case favorable to his position is
subject to qualification that evidence introduced by other party cannot be used if it
contradicts party's own evidence or is contrary to his theory.

ANDERSON, P J , and JAMES
KEET, J r , Special Judge, concur.

Reversed and remanded.
1. Evidence ©=592

H.

BURGDORFER ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant,
v.
VOYLES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant-Respondent,

and
Henry B. Classe and Helma Classe,
Defendants-Respondents.
Nos. 32844, 32845.
St. Louis Court of Appeals.
Missouri
Sept 17, 1968

*%
»* Action for mechanic's hen. The Circuit Court, City of St. Louis County, WilKam E. Buder, J., entered judgment for
Pontiff and defendant appealed.
The
^cmrt of Appeals, Clemens, C , held that
^contractor could rely on builder's testimony
jh*t builder agreed to pay contractor $7,^ , t o wire 14 apartment units to establish
fitfact price although that price differed
IS0* contractor's testimony that original

2. Mechanics, Liens <S=28I(I)
Contractor could rely on builder's testimony that builder agreed to pay contractor $7,525 to wire 14 apartment units to establish contract price although that price
differed from contractor's testimony that
original agreement was for 12 units for
$6,500 with tentative plans for two additional units where contractor's petition was
based on contract and sought money judgment and mechanic's lien of $8,003 09 for
work and materials furnished at builder's
request, without specifying any number of
units.
3. Mechanics' Liens <§=>288(l)
Evidence, in mechanic's hen action,
was sufficient for jury, on basis of builder's testimony, to find that builder had
promised to pay contractor $7,525 to wire
14 apartment units even though contractor
testified that original agreement was for
12 units for $6,550 with tentative plans for
two additional units.
4. Trial <£=>I09
Verdict should be directed against
plaintiff when his opening statement contains admissions precluding his recovery.
5. Evidence C=207(2)
Plaintiff's opening statement that he
had a different recollection about initial
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the enactment, no matter how actually excusable, does not protect him from liability for any harm caused by its violation to
an interest which the enactment is designed to protect. This
is true although the enactment establishes a standard of conduct
which is in direct contradiction to that customarily regarded as
necessary. The same is true when a course of judicial decision
has fixed a standard different from that which had been previously regarded as sufficient. Not only must the actor know
the statutory and common law, in so far as it establishes a
standard of obligatory behavior, at the risk of incurring liability
if he falls below it, but he must also know such law in so far as
obedience to it is likely to determine the conduct of others.
In the absence of some reason to know that others habitually
violate such standards, or that a particular person is about to do
so, he should expect them to be obeyed and regulate his conduct
accordingly.
Illustration:
7. An ordinance of the city of X requires trolley cars
to stop at the near side of every boulevard crossing. A is
driving an automobile along an intersecting street. He is
about to pass between a trolley car and the curb. The car
is approaching a boulevard crossing but gives no evidence
of its purpose to stop. A speeds up to pass. The car stops
and a passenger, B, alights. A's automobile is then going so
fast that when he sees the car about to stop he is unable
to stop his automobile in time to avoid running over B. Irrespective of whether A knows of the ordinance or resides
in X, he is negligent, since he is charged with knowledge of
the ordinance and should expect the car to stop, unless there
is some particular reason to believe that the motorman does
not intend to obey the ordinance.
§ 2 9 1 . Unreasonableness; How Determined; Magnitude of
Risk and Utility of Conduct
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would
recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk
is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of
such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as
the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which
it is done.
See Reporter's Notes.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References

54

A 3

Ch. 12

STANDARD OF CONDUCT

§ 291

Comment:
a. The problem involved may be expressed in homely terms
by asking whether "the game is worth the candle/'
6. Burden of proof. Conduct is not negligent unless the
magnitude of the risk involved therein so outweighs its utility as
to make the risk unreasonable. Therefore, one relying upon
negligence as a cause of action or defense must convince the
court and jury that this is the case.
c. Standardized judgment
In determining whether the
actor should realize the unreasonable character of a known or
recognizable risk, the judgment of the actor, unless he be a child,
must conform to the standard of a reasonable man, neither more
nor less. He is not excused because he is peculiarly inconsiderate
of others or reckless of his own safety, nor is he negligent if his
moral or social conscience is so sensitive that he regards as improper conduct which a reasonable man would regard as proper.
In this respect the problem differs somewhat from that of determining whether the actor should recognize the risk which his
conduct involves and its magnitude, in which allowance is made
for certain physical infirmities and in which the actor is required
to utilize such superior qualities as he may possess. As to the
standard to which the judgment of a child must conform, see
§283 A.
d. Weighing risk against utility of conduct which creates
it. The magnitude of the risk is to be compared with what the
law regards as the utility of the act. If legal and popular opinion
differ, it is the legal opinion which prevails. The point upon
which there is likely to be such divergence between the two is
usually in respect to the social value of the respective interests
concerned. If the legal valuation differs from that attached to the
respective interests by a persistent and long-continued course of
public conviction, as distinguished from a novel and possibly
ephemeral opinion, courts should and often do re-examine their
.valuation and make it conform to the settled popular opinion.
^ In so far as the legal valuation depends upon the settled public
^conviction at the time and place, there is often a necessary difference of decision on a particular question, not only between
* England and America, but even between different States of the
yjnited States.
p h e. The law attaches utility to general types or classes of acts
.as appropriate to the advancement of certain interests rather than
sto the purpose for which a particular act is done, except in the
9— Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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case in which the purpose is of itself of such public utility as to
justify an otherwise impermissible risk. Thus, the law regards
the free use of the highway for travel as of sufficient utility to
outweigh the risk of carefully conducted traffic, and does not ordinarily concern itself with the good, bad, or indifferent purpose
of a particular journey. It may, however, permit a particular
method of travel which is normally not permitted if it is necessary to protect some interest to which the law attaches a preeminent value, as where the legal rate of speed is exceeded in the
pursuit of a felon or in conveying a desperately wounded patient
to a hospital.
/. Misfeasance and non-feasance. An act is negligent if
the risk involved in it outweighs its utility. On the other hand,
it is not enough to create a duty to take positive action for the
protection of another that the burden of giving the protection
is out of all proportion small as compared to other's need thereof. (See § 314, Comment c.) Some relationship between the
parties or some precedent action is necessary to create such a
duty, and duties of positive action are not imposed except under
circumstances in which normally the benefit to the other outweighs the burden to the actor. (See §§ 314-324 A.) Even
where the relationship or precedent act is one which usually
creates a duty of protective action, no such duty exists if the
benefit to the other is less than, or merely equal to, the utility
of action or inaction to the actor.
g. There is rarely an absolute duty to secure the other's
protection. The duty is usually to take reasonable care to give
protection. As in all cases where reasonable conduct is involved,
the reasonable character of the care depends upon whether the
interference with the actor's own affairs is warranted by the
other's danger.
§ 2 9 2 * Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Actor's
Conduct
In determining what the law regards as the utility of
the actor's conduct for the purpose of determining
whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are
important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the
interest which is to be advanced or protected by the
conduct;
See Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will
be advanced or protected by the particular course of
conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can
be adequately advanced or protected by another and less
dangerous course of conduct.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment on Clause ( a ) :
a. Legal valuation of actor's interests. The most important factor in determining the utility of the actor's conduct
is the value which the law attaches to the interest which the
conduct is intended and appropriate to advance or protect. The
interest may be exclusively public, as in the case of the apprehension of an actual or reasonably supposed criminal. It may
be a purely private interest of the actor or a third person. It may
be an interest which is primarily of private advantage, but the
'public may nonetheless be interested, not merely as the protector of the private interest, but also because the general public
good is advanced by the protection and advancement of such
private interests. Thus, the idea that the interest of the public
as a group can best be served by permitting the utmost freedom
"of individual initiative is inherent in both legal and popular
thought. The irreducible minimum of risk both to employees
[and outsiders which is inherent in manufacture is not regarded
fas unreasonable, not so much because manufacture is profitable
tto those who carry it on, but because it is believed that the whole
^community benefits by it. The operation of railways and other
fpublic utilities, no matter how carefully carried on, produces
^accidents which kill or harm many people but the risk involved
un the operation is more than counterbalanced by the service
jjrhich they render the public.
i r 6. Deviation from popular valuation of interests. It is the
value which the law attaches to the interest which is decisive of
the utility of conduct which serves it. The value attached by the
Daw to the great majority of interests is identical with the value
(which popular opinion attaches to them. There are, however,
interests to which a persistent course of decisions has, expressly
f>v by implication, attached a value different from that which
|he jury would ordinarily attach thereto. In such case, it is the
1 ? ^ an( * n o t the popular valuation which is controlling.
M— Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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Comment on Clause •;
c. Alternative opj.
-ir-u- t v advance his interest.
If the actor can advance or protect his interest as adequately by
other conduct which involves less risk of harm to others, the risk
contained in his conduct is clearly unreasonable. If any o^her
practicable course of conduct is clearly likely to give his interest
a less adequate advancement or protection the question whether
the risk is or is not unreasonable depends upon whether the
additional risk involved in the particular course of conduct outweighs the additional advancement or protection which it is
likely to secure. In determining whether an actor has acted
reasonably in pursuing a particular course of conduct rather than
another and less dangerous course, account is also taken of the
fact that he was acting in an emergency which required him to
make an immediate decision (see ? 296),
§ 2 9 3 . Factors
Risk

Magnitude u.

In determining ine magnitude .-• *:•*- nsk fo* the purpose of determining whether the actor is negligent, the
following factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attache^ to the
interests which are imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion of any interest of the other
or of one of a class of which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the
interests imperiled;
(d I the number of persons whose interests are J; to be invaded if lh<» risk takes effect in harm.
S«*e Reporter's Notes.
Comment on daube ;**;;.
a. As the social value of the interest imperiled increases,
the magnitude of the risk which is justified diminishes. Conduct which would be unreasonable if it created a risk of harm
to life or limb might be justified if it should imperil only some
property interest of merely dignitary or slight tangible value.
See Appendix for ^ p o r t e r ' s Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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Henry MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ASHLAND CHEMICAL, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Henry MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ASHLAND CHEMICAL, INC., et
aL, Defendants,
and
Ozone Waters, Inc. and Ebco Manufacturing Co., Defendants-Appellee.
Nos. 82-3303, 82-3521, 82-3531
and 82-3598
Summary Calendar
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
April 25, 1983.
In a Louisiana diversity action, plaintiff sought damages from several defendants for personal injuries sustained in a
propane gas explosion on premises of one of
the defendants. Appeals brought by plaintiff from dismissal of his claims against
some of the defendants by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana at New Orleans, Adrian
G. Duplantier, J., were consolidated. The
Court of Appeals, Tate, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1) it could not be said as matter of
law, under Louisiana law, that defendant
did not create unreasonable risk of injury to
plaintiff worker by placing its gas containers to be filled by him adjacent to water
cooler that would emit sparks when motor
.clicked on as plaintiff filled container with
flammable gas, and issue as to whether
^defendant knew or should have known that
Jts conduct created such risk and whether
.risk so created was unreasonable were issues for trier of fact, but (2) as matter of
paw, under Louisiana law, such alleged defect in water cooler did not constitute defect or create unreasonable risk of injury to
[others.
pJ* Affirmed in part, reversed and remandW in part, and dismissed in part.

1. Federal Courts <®=»600
Where although fewer than all claims
were decided in federal district court the
judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim
against one defendant was not entered with
certification required, dismissal of appeal
without prejudice, as premature, was required. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 54(b), 28
U.S.OA.
2. Negligence <s=>121.1(6)
Under law of Louisiana, whether liability is sought to be imposed on defendant by
reason either of negligence or of strict liability under statute, injured plaintiff is required to prove that risk from which his
damage resulted was an unreasonable risk
of harm. LSA-C.C. arts. 2316, 2317, 2322.
3. Negligence <s=»22
Under Louisiana law, determination
whether defendant has created or maintained unreasonable risk of harm to another
involves balancing whether risk is of such
magnitude as to outweigh what law regards
as social utility of defendant's conduct,
premises or thing or manner in which defendant's conduct is done or his premises
maintained or his thing manufactured,
whether defendant is sought to be held
liable for his negligence under Louisiana
strict liability theories. LSA-C.C. arts.
2316, 2317, 2322.
4. Negligence <§=»22
Under Louisiana law, in determining
whether defendant has created or maintained unreasonable risk of harm to another, ease of association of plaintiffs injury
with rule relied upon, upon which defendant's liability is sought to be based, is always proper consideration. LSA-C.C. arts.
2316, 2317, 2322.
5. Federal Civil Procedure @=>2515
Issues that require determination of
reasonableness of acts and conduct of parties under all facts and circumstances of
case cannot ordinarily be disposed of by
summary judgment. LSA-C.C. arts. 2316,
2317, 2322.

A 4

6. Negligence ®=>136(18)
It could not be said as niatter of law,
under Louisiana law, that defendant did not
create unreasonable risk of injury to plaintiff worker by placing propane gas containers to be filled by him adjacent to water
cooler that would emit sparks when motor
clicked on, thus creating foreseeable hazard
of gas explosion injuring plaintiff while, as
expected, he filled container with flammable gas, and issues as to whether defendant
knew or should have known that its conduct
created such risk and whether risk so created was unreasonable were issues for trier of
fact LSA-C.C. arts. 2316, 2317, 2322.
7, Negligence ®=»20
As matter of law, under Louisiana law,
alleged defect in defendant's water cooler
in that it emitted electric sparks when motor clicked on did not constitute defect or
create unreasonable risk of injury to others,
there being no permissible inference that
defendant water cooler manufacturer, distinguishable from plaintiff's actual or presumed knowledge, should reasonably have
anticipated foreseeable use of water cooler
in dangerous proximity to flammable gas.
LSA-C.C. arts. 2316, 2317, 2322.

several defendants for personal injuries he
sustained in a propane gas explosion on the
premises of Ashland Chemical, one of the
defendants. These four consolidated appeals are brought by Matthews from the
i -n-issal of his claims against some of the
; ir'-unts.
His claims against other de"'^ are still pending below.
.Matthews, a propane gas delivery man,
was filling a gas cylinder left out for him
on the loading dock of the defendant Ashland, a customer. For purposes of summary judgment, the explosion occurred because of an electrical spark emitted from
the motor of a water cooler near the cylinder. Ashland was the custodian or owner
of the premises and of both water cooler
and cylinder and had placed the latter in
proximity to one another. The water cooler
had been manufactured by the defendantappellee Ebco and had been leased to Ashland by the defendant-appellee Ozone.

[1] Initially, we note that, although
claims are still pending below, the judgment dismissing the plaintiff Matthews'
claim against Ozone (Supp.Rec, document
132) was not entered with the certification
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) when fewer
than all claims are decided, so this appeal
Ri
i -in, New Orleans, La., I hilip (our appeal No. 82-3521) must be dismissed
\ G
Gretna, La., for plaintiff-appel- without prejudice as premature. The aplant
peals as to the dismissals against Ashland
• Jones, "W alker, W aechter, Poitevent, and Ebco are, however, properly before us,
Carrere & Dengre, John J. Weigel, New since so certified and directed for entry.
Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees
For reasons more fully set forth below,
we
find that a disputed factual issue is
John H. Musser, IV, New Orleans, La ,
presented
as to whether Ashland had creatfor Ozone Waters.
ed an unreasonable risk of harm to others,
Camp, Carmouche, Palmer, Barsh &
so as to be liable under Louisiana negliHunter, Donald A. Hoffman, New Orleans,
gence or strict liability theories, and that
I a for Ebco Mfg. Co.
therefore summary judgment was improviAppeals from the United States District dently granted in favor of this defendant
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (our appeals No. 82-3303 and No. 82-3598).
However, we also find that the district
Before GEE, RANDALL and TATE, Cir- court did not err as a matter of law in
holding that, under the facts presented,
cuit Judges
there was no defect in the spark-causing
TATE, Circuit Judge:
water cooler that would subject its manuIn this Louisiana diversity action, the facturer Ebco (our appeal No. 82-3521) ^ to
plaintiff Matthews seeks damages from Louisiana negligence or products liability
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recovery, and we therefore affirm the summary judgments dismissing Matthews*
claim as against this defendant.
I.
Resolving all factual inferences in favor
of Matthews, and construing the facts
shown most favorably to him as the nonmoving party in a summary judgment determination, Impossible Electronics Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Systems, Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir.
1982), the accident occurred when Matthews, a propane gas route delivery salesman for Amoco Oil Company, was filling a
propane gas cylinder (used to power forklifts) in a warehouse leased and operated by
Ashland. The empty cylinder (one of three)
had been left by Ashland for filling at a
place within the warehouse immediately adjacent to a water cooler (manufactured by
Ebco and leased to Ashland by Ozone, a
supplier of spring water). After properly
connecting the hose to the first cylinder,
Matthews got a drink of water from the
water cooler. A moment later, the water
cooler made a clicking sound which was
immediately followed by the explosion
which caused the plaintiff's injuries.1
I At least for summary judgment purposes,
it must be accepted that the probable cause
of the explosion was a spark generated by
the electrical motor of the water cooler
when it kicked on. Although the district
court made no express finding to this effect
or against it, deposition testimony in the
record supports this causation. In dismissing Matthews' claims against the water
cooler defendants (Ebco and Ozone), the
district court itself noted that "all motors
throw sparks" but that nevertheless the
!• We note that certain facts, potentially material m a trial on the merits, are in controversy;
for example, the defendant contends (I) that
the cylinders weighed, at most, seventy pounds
when filled, and could have been easily moved
to be safely filled outside the warehouse (this is
denied by the plaintiff), (2) that the gas escaped
because of a faulty nozzle connection or the
carelessness of the plaintiff (denied by the
plaintiff), (3) that the water cooler functioned
normally before and after the accident and was
free of all defects (denied by the plaintiff who
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water cooler motor was not defective "by
virtue of [its] emitting sparks."
In granting summary judgment to Ashland, the district court found that the above
undisputed facts presented no factual issue
and indisputably showed that Ashland had
not failed to use reasonable care in placing
the empty gas cylinder next to the water
cooler; and it further found no basis for
Louisiana strict liability as custodian or
premise-owner in Ashland's placing non-defective empty propane cylinders near a nondefective electric water cooler with the expectation that Matthews would fill them
with explosive propane gas. In granting
summary judgment to the water cooler defendants (Ebco and Ozone), the district
court found that the water cooler "was not
defective by virtue of emitting sparks or an
arc" and that these defendants "had no
duty to warn Matthews that the compressor
may emit sparks and should not be used
around flammable gases."
It should be noted that the narrow issue
presented by these appeals concerns only
whether the district court erred in holding
that the defendants' conduct or equipment
did not subject them to liability under Louisiana negligence or strict liability theories.
The district court did not reach the issue of
whether the plaintiff Matthews himself
might be barred from recovery by his contributory negligence or assumption of the
risk, and we do not reach that issue for that
reason. (Further conflicting factual showings in the record before us make summary
judgment inappropriate for resolution of
that issue by us on appeal.) Thus, in a
sense, the issue before us on appeal for
summary judgment purposes concerns the
defendants' liability independent of Matnow argues that the accident occurred when an
unsealed thermostatic switch within the water
cooler generated a spark, in turning its compressor off or on, which ignited the propane
gas), and (4) that filling the cylinder within an
enclosed space or near a motor was contrary to
safety practices of the plaintiffs employer,
Amoco Oil Company (denied by the plaintiff);
and, finally, (5) the parties also differ in their
estimates of the distances separating the water
cooler from the propane cylinder.

thews' individual conduct or expertise,
somewhat as if an innocent bystander instead of the experienced Matthews had
been injured by the explosion. CY., Brownlee v. Louisville Varnish Company, 641 F.2d
397, 401 (5th Cir.1981).

is sought to be imposed on a defendant by
reason either of negligence or of its strict
liability under La.Civ.C. arts. 2317, 2322,3 an
injured plaintiff is required to prove that
"the risk from which his damage resulted
posed an unreasonable risk of harm." 427
So.2d at 1149.

II.
The issues thus posed by these appeals
may be stated as follows: As to Ashland:
Is this defendant at actionable fault, either
because negligent, La.Civ.C. art. 2316, or by
virtue of its strict liability as the custodian
of things, La.Civ.C art. 2317, or owner of
premises, La.Civ.C. art. 2322, because it
placed gas cylinders for filling next to a
water cooler that emitted sparks when the
motor clicked on, because of actual or presumed knowledge of that latter fact and of
the further circumstance that Matthews
would fill those cylinders as placed by Ashland 2 with flammable propane gas that
would explode if a spark emitted during the
filling? As to Ebco: Did the characteristics
of the water cooler of emitting electrical
sparks when its motor kicked on constitute
a defect so as to implicate liability under
Louisiana negligence or products strict liability theories?

[3] Entrevia notes that the determination of whether the defendant has created
oi maintained an unreasonable risk of harm
is determined on the basis of "a balancing
of claims and interests, a weighing of the
risk and the gravity of harm, and a consideration of individual and societal rights arid
obligations," 427 So.2d at 1149, weighing
the "magnitude of the risk and the gravity
of the harm threatened", 427 So.2d at
1149, a weighing that calls upon the judge
"to decide questions of social utility that
require him to consider the particular case
in terms of moral, social and economic considerations", 427 So.2d at 1149. As Entrevia indicates, the judge's duty in determining whether the defendant has created an
unreasonable risk of harm in part partakes
of a determination of law ("it is necessary
for the judge, in shaping his decision about
how the law applies to the facts, to consider
the particular situation from the same
[2] Central in law and fact to the deci • standpoint as would a legislator regulating
sion of these issues is whether, as to each the matter", 427 So.2d at 1149,4 as well as
defendant, its conduct or equipment created a determination of fact as to whether the
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. In defendant's conduct or thing created an units recent decision in Entrevia v. Hood, 427 reasonable risk of harm in the particularSo.2d 1146 (La.1983), the Supreme Court of ized situation presented for decision. See
Louisiana made plain that, whether liability Andrus v. Trailers Unlimited, 647 F.2d 556
2

rhe plaintiff Matthews* discovery deposition,
indicates that an Ashland employee would
place the cylinders on Ashland's loading platform and await Matthews' arrival and that he
always filled them as placed. Dep., pp. 50-53,
56-57. This is a controverted issue, however.
i

t**n 11., d i-hiei difference is th.it
1<
i-nu^r in re£h£pnce the dr

but that the
whether the risk
differ for negligence or stn
So.2d at 1150. To same effect, , .,.
Stores, Inc., 387 So.2d 585 (La. 1980).

:,

4, In Andrus v. Trailers Unlimited, 647 F.2d 556,
559 (5th Cir.1981), in analyzing the Louisiana
jurisprudence with regard to the determination
of whether a risk of injury falls within 'the
ambit of the duty owned by the defendant, we
noted that "[i]t is, therefore, an inherently judicial function to say whether there is any legal
principle to cover the risk of injury sustained
by the plaintiff." The Andrus court ultimately
held that an issue of fact precluding a directed
verdict was presented as to whether the defendant breached its duty under the particular
ized facts presented, having noted that 'the
court determines whether the risks should fall
within the scope of the defendant's duty, but
that the trier of fact (the jury, there) determines whether the defendant's conduct foreseeably had violated such duty. 647 F.2d at 559.
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(5th Cir.1981), for analysis of prior Louisiana jurisprudence to the same effect.

against Ebco, the manufacturer of the
water cooler, should be affirmed, but that
[4] In accord with prior Louisiana ju- disputed issues or inferences of fact prerisprudence, Entrevia thus illustrates that cluded the entry of summary judgment disthe determination of whether the defendant missing Matthews' claim against Ashland.
has created or maintained an unreasonable
[5] Summary judgment may be granted
risk of harm to another involves a balancing only where—after considering all factual
of whether the risk is of such magnitude 5 showings and inferences in the light most
as to outweigh what the law regards as the favorable to the opposing party—there is
social utility6 of the defendant's conduct, "no genuine issue as to any material fact
premises, or thing or the manner in which and the opposing party is entitled to judgthe defendant's conduct is done or his prem- ment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.
ises maintained or his thing manufactured, 56(3); Williams v. Shell Oil Company, 677
whether the defendant is sought to be held F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir.1982). "A court must
liable for his negligence, Hebert v. Gulf not decide any factual issues it finds in the
States Utilities Company, 426 So.2d 111 (La. record, but if such are present, the courts
1983); Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 260 must deny the motion and proceed to triLa. 542,256 So.2d 620 (1972), or under Loui- a l . . . . [Even] [i]f reasonable minds might
siana strict liability theories, Olsen v. Shell differ on the inferences arising from undisOil Co., 365 So.2d 1285 (La.1978); Loescher puted facts, then the court should deny
v. Parr, 324 So.2d 441 (La.1975); Weber v. summary judgment." Impossible ElectronFidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, ics Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protec250 So.2d 754 (1971). Further, "the ease of tive Systems, supra, 669 F.2d at 1031.
association of the [plaintiff's] injury with Summary judgment is ordinarily (but not
the rule relied upon [upon which the de- always) inappropriate when the issue infendant's liability is sought to be based] . . . volves negligence or contributory negliis always a proper consideration." Hill v. gence, 10 Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal
Lundin & Associates, supra, 260 La. at 549, Practice and Procedure, § 2729 (2d ed.
P p 256 So.2d at 622; Andrus v. Trailers Unlim- 1983), since "even where there is no dispute
as to the facts, it is usually for the jury to
* f~ ited, supra, 647 F.2d at 560.
decide whether the conduct in question
meets the reasonable man standard." Id.,
III.
, r Tested in the light of these principles, we at p. 217. Issues that require "the determifind for reasons to be stated that the dis- nation of the reasonableness of the acts and
trict court's grant of summary judgment conduct of the parties under all the facts
dismissing the plaintiff Matthews' claim and circumstances of the case, cannot ordiCf. Restatement 2d of Torts § 293 (1965): 6.
* Factors Considered in Determining Magnitude of Risk
In determining the magnitude of the risk for
the purpose of determining whether the actor
is negligent, the following factors are imporv
tant:
(a) the social value which the law attaches
to the interests which are imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion of any
interest of the other or of one of a class of
which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be
caused to the interests imperiled;
(d) the number of persons whose interests
are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect
in harm.

Cf Restatement 2d of Torts § 292 (1965):
Factors Considered in Determining Utility
of Actor's Conduct
In determining what the law regards as the
utility of the actor's conduct for the purpose
of determining whether the actor is negligent,
the following factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches
to the interest which is to be advanced or
protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by the
particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of
conduct.

m
JS
9
m
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narily be disposed of by summary judgi^ieombe v. breath1 us <t- '•
ment." Gross v. Southern Railway Compa1349 (La.App.19SH
ny, 414 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir 1969).
(Emphasis added.)
\ Ma tth e ws * Claim. Agains t Ashhnd
[6] Construing the disputed facts most
favorably to Matthews for purposes of summary judgment, we cannot say that Ashland did not as a matter of law create an
unreasonable risk of injury to him by placing its containers to be filled by him adjacent to its water cooler that would emit
sparks when the motor clicked on and thus
creating a foreseeable hazard of gas explosion injuring Matthews while, as expected,
he filled the container with flammable gas.
The magnitude of the risk thus created is
not clearly outweighed by utility factors,
and the injury received is closely associated
with the risk thus created* Whether the
defendant Ashland knew or should have
known that its conduct created such risk,
and whether the risk so created was unreasonable under the particularized facts before us, are issues that cannot, in our opinion, be decided as a matter of law but must
be relegated to the trier of fact As we
recently stated in Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corporation, 698 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir.1983), in
affirming the defendant's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of a plaintiff injured by the
defendant's buried gas pipeline:
Under Louisiana law, the owner and
operator of a facility must exercise reasonable care for the safety of persons on
or around his property. Waiter v. Union
Oil Mill, Inc., 369 So.2d 1043, 1047 (L a .
1979); Dyson v. Gulf Modular Corp., 3$8
So 2d 1385, 1390-91 (La.1976); Williams
\ City of Alexandria, 376 So.2d 367, 3?0
(La.App.1979). In determining a particu"•' fondants' duty, consideration should
*m to the nature of the facility and
rs presented hv it. Walker, su4h-

would be exercised by a reasonable per
s,.»- r ., ..; position ?> ./ fnrtual question

;
->
J<: llv4f;,

B Matthews' Claim Against Ebco
~; Matthews' claim against Ebco, the
.,..: wiacturer of the water cooler, is based
on the machine's alleged defect in that it
emitted electrical sparks when the motor
clicked on. We find no error in the district
court's concluding as a matter of law that
this characteristic of the machine did not
constitute a defect or create an unreasonable risk of injury to others.
In dismissing the claim, the district court
noted, a permissible inference from, the fac
tual showings, that "all motors throw
sparks", and found that Ebco's motor in the
water cooler previously sold by it to Ozone
and installed by Ozone on Ashland's premises was not defective simply because it emitted electrical sparks. Implicit in the district court's finding was its conclusion that
the social utility of producing water coolers
for use in the offices and plants throughout
the United States—which could not feasibly
be produced without motors emitting
sparks—far outweighed any slight risk that
might result from the not closely associated
risk and not readily foreseeable use of the
water cooler in the immediate 'vicinity of
flammable gas.
The factual showing negatives and does
not permit an inference that Ebco, distinguishably from Ashland's actual or presumed knowledge, should reasonably have
anticipated a foreseeable use, Branch v.
Chevron International Oil Company, 681
F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir.1982) (Louisiana products liability law), of its water cooler in
dangerous proximity to flammable gas, so
as to constitute either a defect in the machine (as unreasonably dangerous to normal
use), Id., or to require Ebco to place a
A-.-jrr.mg on its machines cautioning against
•aich use. As stated by the Supreme Court
•)f Louisiana in holding that under the or-LHisumces shown a premise defect was not
artk-nable, "the magnitude of the risk posed
and the gravity of the harm threatened
were small in comparison with that of other

STEERE TANK LINES, INC. v. I.C.C.
Cite as 703 F.2d 927 (1983)

risks presented by things in our society."
Entrevia, supra, 427 So.2d at 1150.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated:
(1) The appeal of the plaintiff Matthews
from the dismissal of his claim against
Ozone, our appeal No. 82-3521, is DISMISSED without prejudice as premature;
(2) In appeal Nos. 82-3303 and 82-3598,
the district courts grant of summary judgment dismissing Matthews' claims against
Ashland is REVERSED, and these claims
are remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion; and
, (3) We AFFIRM the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Ebco in appeal No.
82-3531, dismissing Matthews' claim as
against that defendant.
1
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
AND REMANDED IN PART, AND DISMISSED IN PART.

STEERE TANK LINES, INC., Petitioner,
v.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of
America, Respondents.
No. 82-4309
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
April 25, 1983.

Petitioner, joined by intervening peti^turner, sought review of Interstate Commerce Commission order granting interve[8?fj certificate of public convenience and
ijtecessity to operate as common carrier over
R e g u l a r routes between points in several
^wates. The Court of Appeals, Tate, Circuit
held that: (1) carefully drawn four-
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state-nonradial/two-state-radial authority
granted to intervenor was not arbitrary or
capricious and was supported by substantial
evidence, and (2) intervenor made showing
adequate to sustain finding of financial fitness.
Affirmed.
1. Commerce o=>169, 174
Review by Court of Appeals of Interstate Commerce Commission order granting
certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate as common carrier is limited
to determining whether Commission's conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, abuse of
discretion, not in accordance with law or
unsupported by substantial evidence; if
Commission's findings are grounded on such
relevant evidence as reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support conclusion,
they must be upheld. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2).
2. Commerce <§=»108
Review of supporting shipper affidavits
submitted by petitioner for certificate of
public convenience and necessity to operate
as motor common carrier transporting petroleum and petroleum products supported
conclusion of Interstate Commerce Commission that petitioner had demonstrated need
for service throughout substantial portions
of territory sought, and, when viewed as a
whole, carefully drawn four-state-nonradial/two-state-radial authority granted was
not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. Revised Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 10101 et seq, 10922(b)(1).
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=»791
Fact that two different conclusions
could be drawn from evidence does not prevent agency's finding from being supported
by substantial evidence.
4. Commerce <@=>169
As long as Interstate Commerce Commission considers relevant factors and articulates rational connection between facts
found and choice made, decision is not "arbitrary or capricious."
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

iuurv/iw

mien,

/ay

Cite as 254 N.,W.2d 759
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:mg. and Ronald Momng,
i'. ir % \\ Plaintiffs-Appellants,

creation of an unreasonable risk of harm in
marketing slingshot directly to children was
question for jury.

3. Negligence <s=» 119(1)
\
It obscures the separate issues in negliI M'JPII ALFONO, a minor, 1:!' vonne *.-.«gence case to combine and state them toi ni ni ni ni I Vincent Alfono, and Georgettrgether m terms of whether there is a duty
Campbell, d/b/a Campbell Discount Jew- lo refrain from particular conduct.
elry, King Tobacco and Grocery Co., a
Michigan Corporation, and C hem toy CorNegligence ^>]
poration (formerly Chemical Sundries,
v iigence* is conduct involving an
Inc.), a Foreign Corporation, jointly and
< ttm- n<*« of harm.
severally, Defendants-Appellees,
M publication Words and Phrases
t / «ther judicial constructions and
No, 55669,
If"

MOT>

Supreme Court of Michigan,
June 15, 1977.
Twelve-year-old boy bi ought negli
gence action against manufacturer, whole
saler and retailer of 10 c slingshot seeking
recovery for loss of sight of an eye which
was struck by a pellet fired from, a slingshot being used by his 11-year-old playmate.
The Circuit Court, Wayne County, directed
verdict for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Division I,
affirmed, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Levin, J,, held that whether
manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer, in
violation of obligation of due care to bystander affected by use of product, created
unreasonable risk of harm in marketing
slingshots directly to children was a jury
question.
Reversed and remanded.
Fitzgerald, J., dissented with opinhi\ 111
which Coleman, J.» joined,
1. Products Liability <s=>22
:
Manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of manufactured products owe a legal
obligation of due care to bystanders affected by use of the products.
2. Products Liability <fc»88
p»- Whether manufacturer, wholesaler and
retailer of 10 <fc slingshot were in violation
°f obligation of due care to bystander by

1

'p^ss of risk of harm,, wheth,ressed in terms of duty,
r
the specific standard of
regarded as issue of law
r faa
i court or the jury to
iK'ae, L~ .
,ow the utility of the dei * iants' conduct is viewed in relation to
IJU magnitade </ thtr risk.

Preference for jury resolution of issue
of negligence is not simply an expedient
reflecting the difficulty of stating a rule
that will readily resolve all cases; rather, it
is rooted in the belief that the jury's judgment of what is reasonable under the circumstances of a particular case is more
likely than the judicial judgment to represent the community's judgment of how
reasonable persons would conduct themselves.
7. Negligence <e» 136(14
If experience should be that juries invariably reach one result in determining
standard of care, that may suggest specific
standard of care upon which all reasonable
persons would agree; however, until community judgment is made to appear, the
principle that doubtful questions regarding
application of standard of care should be
decided by reference to community judgment requires jury submission of question
:
so in doubt,
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8. Negligence G=>1
Law of negligence was created by common-law judges and, therefore, it is the
court's responsibility to continue to develop
or limit the development of that body of
law absent legislative directive.
9. Negligence <s=>l
Elements of an action for negligence
are duty, general standard of care, specific
standard of care, cause in fact, legal or
proximate cause, and damage.
10. Negligence <s=>2
"Duty" comprehends whether defendant is under any obligation to the plaintiff
to avoid negligent conduct; it does not include where there is an obligation, the nature of the obligation, the general standard
of care and the specific standard of care.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
11. Negligence ^ 136(14, 25)
While court in negligence action decides questions of duty, general standard of
care and proximate cause, jury decides
whether there is cause in fact in the specific
standard of care and whether defendants'
conduct in particular case is below general
standard of care, including, unless court is
of opinion that all reasonable persons would
agree or there is an overriding legislatively
or judicially declared public policy, whether
in the particular case the risk of harm created by the defendants' conduct is or is not
reasonable.
12. Negligence <s=>2, 56(1.4)
"Duty" is essentially a question of
whether the relationship between the actor
and the injured person gives rise to any
legal obligation on the actor's part for the
benefit of the injured person; while proximate cause encompasses a number of distinct problems including the limits of liability for foreseeable consequences.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
13. Products Liability <s=>6
A manufacturer owes consumer an obligation to avoid negligent conduct and the

obligation extends to persons within
foreseeable scope of the risk.
14. Products Liability <s=>88
Eleven-year-old's shooting pellets
ward tree with a slingshot and ricochet ii
12-year-old playmate's eye was within 1
"recognizable risk of harm" created by m
keting slingshot directly to children and 1
ricochet was "a normal consequence of 1
situation" created by manufacturers, reti
ers and wholesalers' conduct, thus, creati
jury question on liability of manufactur
retailer, and wholesaler.
15. Negligence <s=>4
In a negligence case, standard of cc
duct is reasonable or due care.
16. Products Liability e=>23
A person who supplies an article to
child which may pose a reasonable risk
harm in the hands of an adult but whi
poses an unreasonable risk of harm in t
hands of the child is subject to liability i
resulting harm under doctrine of neglige
entrustment.
17. Products Liability <s=>23
Doctrine of negligent entrustment
not limited to plaintiffs whose "individus
propensities are known to the supplier; dc
trine also applies to classes of persoi
18. Negligence <s=>26
Parent and Child o=>13(l)
A parent or other responsible adt
who entrusts a potentially dangerous i
strumentality to a child may be subject
liability.
19. Products Liability <@=>23
Liability under doctrine of neglige
entrustment arises from the defendant's a
of misconduct; he has actually created \
unreasonable risk to others by placing
chattel in the hands of a person whose u
thereof is likely to create a recognizab
risk to third persons.
20. Negligence @=»7
The obligation to guard or secure o
jects which are dangerous to children aris
because of the likelihood of their own i

Cite as 254' LW.2d 759

ermeddling; persons dealing with children
nust take notice of the ordinary nature of
roung boys, their tendency to do mischievous acts, and their propensity to meddle
vith anything that com.es in their way.
11. Negligence <s=»39
The attractive nuisance doctrine, an exeption to the general rule limiting liability
f landowners for injuries to trespassers, is
iased on child's inability to appreciate dan;er and his inclination to explore without
egard to the risk.

and others even if the child m:
ed to appreciate the risk ai children may thus appreciate .' ami installed in using the product,
27. Negligence ^=4
Even if a person recognizes that his
conduct involves a risk of invading another
person's interest, he may nevertheless engage in such conduct unless the risk created
by his conduct is unreasonable.

28. Negligence <e=> 136(14)
Balancing of magnitude of the risk and
2. Negligence ^=>39
utility of the actor's conduct in determining
Doctrine of attractive nuisan*
• *-.s whether risk created by conduct is unrea.ot depend on the landowner's knowledge sonable requires a consideration by the
hat the individual child is incompetent. court and the jury of the societal interests
olved; the issue of negligence may be
3. Negligence <s=»14
ioved from jury consideration if the
Doctrine of negligent entrustmein u>
court
concludes that overriding consideraot peculiar to automobiles but, rather, an
tions
of
public policy require that a particurdinary application of general principles
lar
view
be adopted and applied in all cases.
)r determining whether a person's conduct
r
as reasonable in light of the apparent risk, 29. Common Law <s»2
Statutes and other legislative judgI, Negligence «=>14
ments
may themselves be a source of comDoctrine of negligent entrustment is
rounded in general principle that a reason- mon law.
ble person will have in mind the immaturi- 30 Products Liability $»88
rt inexperience and carelessness of chilBalancing the magnitude of risk and
ren.
utility of conduct consisting of manufacture
and sale of slingshots to children, there is
5. Products Liability <s»88
Issue of whether manufacturer, retail- not sufficient basis for concluding as matter
• and wholesaler of slingshot were subject of law that utility of conduct outweighs
> liability for 12-year-old's loss of sight of risk of harm thereby created, and sharp
i eye which was struck by a pellet fired difference of opinion regarding balancing
'om a slingshot being used by his 11-year- of utility and risk of harm would require
d playmate could not be taken from jury submission of questions for jury assessment
l supposition that an 11-year-old boy as part of its consideration of reasonablelows how slingshot operates and, there- ness of risk of harm and of manufacturers',
retailers' and wholesalers' conduct in sale of
re, appreciates the risk.
slingshots,
I. Products Liability <©=»12
Just as the driver of an automobile is 31. Common Law <s=»l
:pected to take precautions for the safety
The common law is not immutable, unchildren playing near a highway even able to respond to change in society and
ough children can be expected to appreci- technology,
., .:,,.>,. l b . a ^ . j u ,.-..
e the risk and the driver does not know
at the individual children are incompetent
look after themselves, so too a supplier
Milan & Miller, Zeff & Zeff, Detroit, for
n be expected in marketing a product to plaintiffs and appellants; Edward Grebs,
ke precautions for the safety of children Detroit, of counsel
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Robert E. Fox, Detroit, for defendant-appellee, cross-appellant and cross-appellee
Chemtoy Corp., formerly Chemical Sundries
Co., appearing specially.
Richard B. Kramer, Southfield, for defendant-appellee, cross-appellant and crossappellee King Tobacco.
Garan, Lucow, Miller, Lehman, Seward &
Copper, by Albert A. Miller, Detroit, for
cross-appellees Joseph Alfono, a minor,
Yvonne Alfono and Vincent Alfono.
LEVIN, Justice.
Royal Moning, when he was 12 years old,
lost the sight of an eye which was struck by
a pellet fired from a slingshot being used by
his 11 year old playmate, Joseph Alfono.
There was evidence that Alfono purchased two lOc-slingshots from defendant
Campbell Discount Jewelry and had given
one to Moning, and that the slingshots had
been manufactured by defendant Chemtoy
Corporation and distributed by defendant
King Tobacco and Grocery Company.
Moning claims that it is negligence to
market slingshots directly to children, and
that the manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer are subject to liability.
The claim against the Alfonos was settled. Upon completion of Moning's proofs,
the trial judge directed a verdict for the
remaining defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
[1,2] We remand for a new trial because a manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer of a manufactured product owe a
legal obligation of due care to a bystander
affected by use of the product, and whether
defendants in violation of that obligation
created an unreasonable risk of harm in
marketing slingshots directly to children is
for a jury to decide, reasonable persons
being of different minds.
My colleague declares that there is no
legal duty to refrain from manufacturing
slingshots for and marketing them directly
to children.

[3] It obscures the separate issue
negligence case (duty, proximate caus
general and specific standard of ca
combine and state them together in
of whether there is a duty to refrain
particular conduct.
It is now established that the mai
turer and wholesaler of a product, by
keting it, owe a legal duty to those af1
by its use. The duty of a retailer
customer with whom he directly deal
well established long before the mai
turer and wholesaler were held to
obligated. The scope of their duty no)
extends to a bystander. All the defen
were, therefore, under an "obligatio
the safety" l of Moning; they owed 1
duty to avoid conduct that was negl
Whether it would be a violation oi
obligation to market slingshots dired
children is not a question of duty, but <
specific standard of care: the reasoi
ness of the risk of harm thereby cr<
[4] Negligence is conduct involvir
unreasonable risk of harm.
Slingshots pose a risk of harm. In r
facturing and marketing slingshots ti
fendants necessarily created such a
The meritorious issues are whet he
risk so created was unreasonable be
the slingshots were marketed direct
children, and whether this should be (
ed by the court or by the jury.
[5] The reasonableness of the rii
harm, whether analyzed or express*
terms of duty, proximate cause or the
cific standard of care, and whether re
ed as one of law or fact or for the cot
the jury to decide, turns on how the u
of the defendants' conduct is view<
relation to the magnitude of the risk
If a court is of the opinion that ma
ing slingshots directly to children is of
utility that it should be fully protectee
court in effect determines as a matt
law that the risk of harm so created i
unreasonable and, therefore, such cond
not negligent.

1. See Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 37, p. 206, quoted in my colleague's opinion.
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The resolution of the balance between the
itility of children having ready-market acgss to slingshots and the risk of harm
hereby created is an aspect of the determination of the reasonableness of that risk
nd of the defendants' conduct, and should
e decided by a jury:
*•'" —Reasonable persons can differ on the
balance of utility and risk, and whether
marketing slingshots directly to children
creates an unreasonable risk of harm;
t' .—The interest of children, in ready* market access to slingshots is not so
clearly entitled to absolute protection in
'comparison with the interest of persons
who face the risk thereby created as to
warrant the Court in declaring, as a rule
of common law, that the risk will be
deemed to be reasonable,
-The statement that "we are being asked
>" perform a legislative task" because a
riding for Moning "would in effect be
iaking a value judgment and saying * *
hat slingshots] should not be manufat
vred or marketed " (emphasis supplied) to
lildren assumes that allowing juries to dede the reasonableness of the risk of harm
•eated by marketing slingshots directly to
lildren will so burden the manufacture
id marketing of slingshots that all manuituring and marketing would cease, rath;;than merely affect the manner and cost
^marketing slingshots, and does not take
to account that however the Court decides
e case it in effect makes a value judgent:;
^.—Affirming a directed verdict for the
defendants in effect expresses a value
judgment that the interest of the child in
ready-market access to slingshots is of
such societal importance that as a matter
of law it takes precedence over the interest in protecting persons exposed to the
fisk of harm so created, or that all read a b l e persons would agree that the risk
Jftrcreated is not unreasonable, • « -,

Si-

|rThe reasonable man represents the general
£7*1 of community intelligence and perception
pd the jury, being a cross-section of the com?£%, should best be able to tell what that
lateral level is." 2 Harper & James, The Law
i Torts, § 16.10, p. 936,

—Reversing1 the directed verdict and
holding that the issue should be decided
by a jury is not an expression of a value
judgment that slingshots should not be
manufactured and marketed, but rather
expresses a value judgment that all reasonable persons do not agree concerning
the reasonableness of the risk so created
and that the interest of the child in
ready-market access is not of such overriding importance as to be entitled to
absolute protection as a matter of law,
and therefore a jury, applying the com- '
munity's judgment of how reasonable
persons would conduct themselves, should
make the ultimate value judgment of the
risks and the societal importance of the
interests involved in marketing slingshots
directly to children
However the Court df
d- .1 necessarily makes a choict
' .he Legislature may later ma?.
-rent choice.
[6] If the issue is left to juries to decide,
different juries will, indeed, reach different
results, sometimes in cases appearing to be
factually indistinguishable. The variant results may be more perceptible in this kind
of case than in one where it may appear
I
-e variables. The preference
for
.iution of the issue of negligei
is not, however, simply an expedient
reflecting the difficulty of stating a rule
that will readily resolve all cases; rather, it
is rooted in the belief that the jury's judgment of what is, reasonable under the circumstances of a particular case is more
likely than the judicial judgment to represent the community's judgment of how
reasonable persons would conduct themselves 2
the experience should be that ju-iabiy reach one result, that may
n< specific standard of care upon
* " reasonable ..persons, would
Similarly see, Prosser, supra, § 37, p 2^1 Detroit & M. R, Co, v. Van Steinbhr., " ** - rw
120 (1868).
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agree.3 Until the community judgment is
made so to appear, the principle that doubtful questions regarding the application of
the standard of care should be decided by
reference to the community judgment requires jury submission of the question so in
doubt.
[8] The law of negligence was created
by common law judges and, therefore, it is
unavoidably the Court's responsibility to
continue to develop or limit the development of that body of law absent legislative
directive. The Legislature has not approved or disapproved the manufacture of
slingshots and their marketing directly to
children; the Court perforce must decide
what the common law rule shall be.
I
Duty and Proximate Cause
While we all agree that the duty question
is solely for the court to decide,4 the specific
standard of care is not part of that question.
[9] The elements of an action for negligence are (i) duty, (ii) general standard of
care, (iii) specific standard of care, (iv)
cause in fact, (v) legal or proximate cause,
and (vi) damage.
[10] "Duty" comprehends whether the
defendant is under any obligation to the
plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct; it does
not include—where there is an obligation—
the nature of the obligation: the general
standard of care and the specific standard
of care.
Dean Prosser observed:
"It is quite possible, and not at all uncommon, to deal with most of the questions
which arise in a negligence case in terms
of 'duty/ Thus the standard of conduct
required of the individual may be expressed by saying that the driver of an
automobile approaching an intersection is
3. See Prosser, supra, § 35, p. 188; 2 Harper &
James, supra, § 17.2, p. 971.
4. See Prosser, supra, § 37, p. 206 See, also,
Elbert v. Saginaw, 363 Mich. 463, 476, 109
N.W.2d 879 (1961).

under a duty to moderate his spe<
keep a proper lookout, or to blo^
horn, but that he is not under a di
take precautions against the unexp
explosion of a manhole cover ir
street. But the problems of 'duty
sufficiently complex without subdh
it in this manner to cover an ei
series of details of conduct. It is I
to reserve 'duty1 for the problem c
relation between individuals which L
es upon one a legal obligation fo
benefit of the other, and to deal
particular conduct in terms of a
standard of what is required to me<
obligation. In other words, 'duty'
question of whether the defendant
der any obligation for the benefit c
particular plaintiff; and in negli
cases, the duty is always the san
conform to the legal standard of rea
* ble conduct in the light of the app
risk. What the defendant must t
must not do, is a question of the sta
of conduct required to satisfy the <
Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 53, p. 324
phasis supplied).
The statement in my colleague's 0]
that the "defendants did not owe pla
minor the asserted duty not to mai
ture, distribute and sell slingshots"
bines the separate questions of duty, $
al and specific standard of care and
mate cause: whether in marketing a
uct a manufacturer, wholesaler and re
are under any legal obligation to a bys
er (duty); the nature of that oblij
(general standard of care: reasonable
duct "in the light of the apparent i
whether marketing slingshots direcl
children is reasonable conduct (sj
standard of care); whether marl
slingshots directly to children is "so s
cant and important a cause [of loss i
ing from such marketing] that the d<
ant should be legally responsible"5 (
mate cause, a policy question often in<
guishable from the duty question).
5. Prosser, supra, § 42, p. 244.
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[11] Combining in one statement these
different questions obscures the functions
of the court and jury. While the courtdecides questions of duty, general standard
of care and proximate cause, the jury decides whether there is cause in fact and the
specific standard of care: 6 whether defendants' conduct in the particular case is below
the general standard of care, including—
unless the court is of the opinion that all
reasonable persons would agree or there is
an overriding legislatively or judicially declared public policy—whether in the particular case the risk of harm created by the
defendants' conduct is or is not reasonable.
[12] Duty is essentially a question of
whether the relationship7 between the actor and the injured person gives rise to any
legal obligation on the actor's part for the
benefit of the injured person. Proximate
cause encompasses a number of distinct
problems including the limits of liability for
foreseeable
consequences.8
In
the
9
Palsgraf case, the New York Court of
Appeals, combining the questions of duty
and proximate cause,10 concluded that no
;
s owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff.
questions of duty and proximate
are interrelated because the question
* w h e r there is the requisite relationship,
giving rise to a duty, and the question
whether the cause is so significant and important to be regarded a proximate cause
ooi h depend in part on foreseeability—
whether it is foreseeable that the actor's
*

n, § 45, pp. 289-290; § 37, pp. 205-208.

7. Id., § 42, p. 244; Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich,
251, 260, 150 N„W„2d 755 (1967).
8. See generally, H. L. A. Hart and A. M. I Ionore, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1973), ch. IX.
9. Palsgraf v. Long I. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 3 J
N.E 99 (1928).
10. Prosser, supra, § 43, p. 254,
U. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N„Y„
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
12. "Agreeing as all of our recent decisions do
with the developing weight of authority, the
. essence of which is that the manufacturer is

conduct may create a risk of harm to the
victim, and whether the result of that conduct and intervening causes were foreseeable.
[13] It is well established that placing a
product on the market creates the requisite
relationship between a manufacturer,
wholesaler and retailer and persons affected by use of the product giving rise to a
legal obligation or duty to the persons so
affected. A manufacturer owes the consumer an obligation to avoid negligent conduct,11 The obligation extends to persons
within the foreseeable scope of the risk. In
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.} 375
Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), a bystander, injured when his brother's shotgun barrel exploded, was permitted to maintain an
action against the manufacturer, wholesaler
and retailer of allegedly defective shotgun
shells.12 •
A manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer
of slingshots can be expected to foresee
that they will be used to propel pellets and
that a person within range may be struck.
Moning, as a playmate of a child who purchased a slingshot marketed by the defendants, was within the foreseeable scope of
the risk created by their conduct in marketing slingshots directly to children. Moning
was a foreseeable plaintiff. The defendant
manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer were
under an obligation for the safety of Moning.
best, able to control dangers arising from defects of manufacture, I would say definitely
that Spence v... Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873;
Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363
Mich. 235, 409" N.W.2d 918; Barefield v. LaSalle Cock:£ola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120
N.W.2d 786, and Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply
Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54, have put
an end in Michigan to the defense of no privity,
certainly so far as concerns an innocent bystander injured as this plaintiff pleads, and that
a person thus injured should have a right of
action against the manufacturer on the theory
of breach of warranty as well as upon the
theory of negligence" Hereefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 97-98, 133 N.W.2d
129, 135 (1965) (emphasis supplied).
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The question of proximate cause, like the
question of duty, is "essentially a problem
of law." 13 Most proximate cause problems
are not involved in this case.14
Alfono's conduct in using the slingshot to
propel pellets was to be anticipated. "If
the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, he may be negligent, among
other reasons, because he has failed to
guard against it; or he may be negligent
only for that reason." Prosser, supra, § 44,
p. 272.

relieved from liability by the fact that
risk, or a substantial and important pari
the risk, to which he has subjected
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Fores
able intervening forces are within the sc
of the original risk, and hence of the
fendant's negligence. The courts are qi
generally agreed that intervening cat
which fall fairly in this category will
supersede the defendant's responsibilil
Id., p. 273.15
Alfono's shooting pellets toward a t
and a ricochet into Moning's eye was wit
the "recognizable risk of harm" created
marketing slingshots directly to childre

[14] By marketing slingshots directly to
children, the defendants effectively created
the risk that Alfono would use the slingshot. "Obviously the defendant cannot be

The ricochet was "a normal conseque
of the situation" created by the defenda
conduct.17

13. Prosser, supra, § 42, p 244
"[I]t is possible to approach •proximate
cause' as a series of distinct problems, more
or less unrelated, to be determined upon different considerations. The list, which is not
necessarily exclusive, would include at least
the following problems.
"1. The problem of causation in fact
* * *
"2. The problem of apportionment of
damages among causes. * * *
"3. The problem of liability for unforeseeable consequences * * *
"4. The problem of intervening causes
* * *
"5. The problem of shifting responsibility
* * * " Id., pp 249-250.
14. See fn 13, supra; there is no issue of apportionment of damages, or of shifting responsibility to another person except insofar as defendants similarly situated might be free to
leave the duty of protecting a person affected
by a child's use of a slingshot to adults were
they to market slingshots in a manner designed
to reach adults and not children, the issue of
causation in fact is for a jury to resolve
15. The Restatement illustrates the scope of the
responsibility for delivering a potentially dangerous chattel to a child
"A gives a loaded pistol to B, a boy of
eight, to carry to C In handing the pistol to
C the boy drops it, injuring the bare foot of
D, his comrade The fall discharges the pistol, wounding C A is subject to liability to
C, but not to D " Restatement 2d, Torts,
§ 281, Illustration to Comment f on Clause
(b).
'if a gun is entrusted to a child, it suggests
at once to anyone with imagination at all that
someone, the child or another, is likely to be
shot." Prosser, supra, § 44, p 273

16/ Restatement, supra, § 281, Comment i
Clause (b)
"So far as scope of duty (or, as s
courts put it, the relation of proximate ca
is concerned, it should make no difien
whether the intervening actor is negligen
intentional or criminal Even criminal
duct by others is often reasonably to be
ticipated After all, if I leave a borrowed
on the streets of New York or Chicago '
doors unlocked and key m ignition I
negligent (at least towards the owner)
cause of the very likelihood of theft Anc
lend a car to one known by me to be hal
ally careless I am negligent precisely bec<
of the likelihood of his negligent operatio
the car Again the importance of the fa
of foreseeabihty is not altered if the inter
ing act is that of plaintiff himself, nor is
that act is a negligent one When I lent
car to the careless driver, one of the i
that made me negligent was surely
chance that he might hurt himself If \
barred from recovery for such hurt it is
cause of his contributory fault, not for ^
of a causal connection or because he is
yond the scope of my duty " 2 Harpt
James, supra, § 20 5, pp 1144-1146
Similarly see Comstock v General Mc
Corp, 358 Mich 163, 179, 99 N W2d 62"]
ALR2d 449 (1959), Berry v Visser, 354 N
38, 47, 92 NW2d 1 (1958)
17. "The intervention of a force which
normal consequence of a situation create
the actor's negligent conduct is not a supei
mg cause of harm which such conduct
been a substantial factor in bringing ab<
Restatement, supra, § 443
"The word 'normal' is not used m
Section in the sense of what is usual, cus
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I!
General Standard of Care Specific
Standard of Care
Turning to a consideration of the nature
of the obligation owed by a manufacturer,
wholesaler or retailer, we note that this is
not an ordinary products liability case
where the plaintiff seeks to recover by
proving a defect in the product without
carrying the burden of proving fault or
negligence. Moning's claim is grounded in
negligence. He asserts that his damage
was caused by the fault of the defendants.
[15] In a negligence case, the standard
of conduct is reasonable or due care. The
Restatement 2d, Torts, § 283, provides:
"The standard of conduct to which [the
actor] must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances." "[I]n negligence cases, the
duty is always the same, to conform to the
legal standard of reasonable conduct in the
light of the apparent risk," Prosser, Torts,
supra, § 53, p. 324,
It is the application of that general standard of conduct to the marketing of slingshots to children, the specific standard of
care—not whether there is a duty of due
care in such marketing—that is the primary
area of disagreement in this case,
Manufacturing and marketing slingshots
necessarily creates a risk of harm. Moning
does not, however, contend that manufacturing and marketing slingshots is negligence per se. His contention, rather, is that
marketing them directly to children creates
an unreasonable risk of harm,
ary, foreseeable, or to be ex.
notes rather the antithesis o+
extraordinary. It means tha
jury, looking at the matter a
and therefore knowing the situau-,r. ^-!.<. r.
existed when the new force intervened, does
not regard its intervention as so extraordinary as to fall outside of the class of normal
events." Id., comment b.
18, The doctrine is not limited to plaintiffs
whose "individual" propensities are known to
the supplier. The comments following Restatement, supra, § 390, show that the doctrine of
negligent entrustment also applies to classes of
persons. Restatement, supra, § 390, Comment.

MlCtl

^^rJ

[16,17] Moning relies on the doctrine of
negligent entrustment, one of the many
specific rules concerning particular conduct
that have evolved in the application of the
general standard of care. A person who
supplies an article to a child which may
pose a reasonable risk of harm in the hands
of an adult but which poses an unreasonable risk of harm in the hands of a child is
subject to liability for resulting harm,*,
"One who supplies directly or through
a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has
reason to know to be likely because of his
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use
it in a manner involving unreasonable
risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to
share in or be endangered by its use, is
subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them." Restatement 2d, Torts,
§ 390.w
[18,19] The common law has long recognized that a parent or other responsible
adult who entrusts a potentially dangerous
instrumentality to a child may be subject to
liability.19 Liability "arises from [the defendant's] active misconduct; he has actually created an unreasonable risk to others by
placing a chattel in the hands of a person
whose use thereof is likely to create a recognizable risk to third persons,"20
[20] The obuga.:.objects which art a^ ±
arises "because of the
own intermedd':i
bee, Harpei \
he Conduct o! .L._

of their
.•Tie Duty To Control
i3 Vale L.J. 886, 894

t
21. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases,
47 N.W.U.L.Rev. 778, 782 (1953). See Terranella v. Union- Building & Construction Co., 3
N.J. 443, 70 A.2d 753 (1950).
"A product designed to be used by adults
who may be expected to exercise care may
not be dangerous, but when intended to be
placed in the hands of inexperienced children
who may seek to enlarge their knowledge by
experimentation of various and sometimes
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with children must "take notice of the ordinary nature of young boys, their tendency
to do mischievous acts, and their propensity
to meddle with anything that came in their
way."22
[21,22] Special rules for children are
not unusual. The attractive nuisance doctrine, an exception to the general rule limiting the liability of landowners for injuries
to trespassers,23 is based on the child's inability to appreciate danger and his inclinaunsuspected character, it may be a source of
peril * * *." Crist v Art Metal Works,
230 App.Div 114, 117, 243 NYS 496, 499
(1930), affd 255 N.Y. 624, 175 NE 341
(1931).
22. Note, Dangerous Toys, 64 Irish L.Times 223,
224 (1930); 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 40, pp.
685-686.
23. See generally, Prosser, supra, § 59, p. 364.
24. While the Restatements illustrations and
the case law applying the doctrine of negligent
entrustment largely concern suppliers of automobiles (see, e. g., Johnson v Cassetta, 197
Cal.App.2d 272, 17 Cal.Rptr. 81 [1961]), it does
not depend on the nature of the chattel. Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 48 Mich.App.
580, 585, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973) (supply of dies
to plaintiffs employer). See also Dee v. Parrish, 160 Tex. 171, 327 S W.2d 449, 452 (1959);
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 69, pp. 949-950; cf
Woods, Negligent Entrustment: Evaluation of
a Frequently Overlooked Source of Additional
Liability, 20 Ark.L.Rev. 101, 107-108 (1966),
Littlejohn, Torts, 21 Wayne L.Rev. 665, 681
(1975). Nor is the doctrine restricted to chattels classified as latently defective or inherently
dangerous. Fredencks, supra, 48 Mich.App p.
584, 211 N.W.2d 44.
The Restatement sets forth a rule crystahzed
by the development of the common law concerning the liability of one who sells or entrusts
devices to children who, because of their youth
and inexperience, cannot be relied on to use
them prudently, or because of their immaturity
may not appreciate the nsk of injury or have
the skill to use such devices safely:
"At common law the legal principle is established that if one sells a dangerous article
or instrumentality such as firearms or explosives to a child whom he knows or ought to
know to be, by reason of youth and inexperience, unfit to be trusted with it, and who
might innocently and ignorantly play with or
use it to his injury, and injury does in fact
result, he may be found guilty of negligence
and consequently liable in damages." Anno.,
Liability of Seller of Firearm, Explosive, or
Highly Inflammable Substance to Child, 20
A.L.R.2d 119, 124.

tion to explore without regard to the
The doctrine does not depend on the 1
owner's knowledge that the "individ
child is "incompetent."
[23,24] The doctrine of negligent
trustment is not peculiar to automobiles
rather an ordinary application of gei
principles for determining whether a
son's conduct was reasonable in light o
apparent risk.24 It is grounded in the
eral principle that a reasonable person
See also 79 Am Jur 2d, Weapons and Fire
§ 43, p 48
"The common law imposes upon ever
the duty of so using and disposing <
property as not to injure the person or
erty of another, and if one sells a dang
article to a child whom he knows to 1
reason of his youth and inexperience, u
be trusted with it, and who probably
innocently and ignorantly play with it
own injury, and injury does in fact res
is liable in damages therefor." McEl
Drew, 138 Iowa 390, 392, 116 N W 14
(1908).
In McEldon, the court held that the seller
cents worth of gun powder to a 12 year c
was liable for the injury to one *of the
eyes caused by an inadvertent explosioi
also Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, 96 A
682 (1868).
Entrusting other devices used by chile
playthings may also give rise to liabihr
Schmidt v. Capital Candy Co, 139 Mm
166 N.W. 502 (1918) (sparkler) (dictum
serman v. Smith, 205 MoApp 657, 22
608 (1920) (fireworks); Gerbino v Gr
Siegel-Cooper Co., 165 App.Div. 76
N.Y.S. 502 (1915) (airgun used on n
premises); Sememuk v Chentis, 1 111
508, 117 NE2d 883 (1954) (airgun;
parents, retailer knew that 7 year old
use), Krueger v Knutson, 261 Minn 1
NW2d 526 (1961) (potassium chlora
Faso v La Faso, 126 Vt 90, 223 A
(1966) (cigarette lighter without fluid)
supra, 64 Irish L Times 223 (citing ca
The only basis for distinguishing the
from the instant case would be to concl
there is a qualitative difference betw
nsk of entrusting such mstrumentahtiei
dren and the nsk posed by marke^tir
shots directly to children. In light of
quency and seventy of mjunes to chi]
tnbutable to slingshots, and the wid
view, expressed in statutes and ore
that children should not be entrust
slingshots, there is no sound basis for
as a matter of law, such a distinctioi
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have in mind the immaturity, inexperience
and carelessness of children. If, taking
those traits into account, a reasonable person would recognize that his conduct involves a risk of creating an invasion of the
child's or some other person's interest, he is
required to recognize that his conduct does
involve such a risk. "He should realize that
the inexperience and immaturity of young
children may lead them to act innocently in
a way which an adult would recognize as
culpably careless, and that older children
are peculiarly prone to conduct which they
themselves recognize as careless or even
reckless." Restatement, supra, § 290, comment k.25
[25] The issue whether the defendants
are subject to liability cannot properly be
taken from the jury on the supposition that
an 11 year old boy knows how a slingshot
operates and, therefore, appreciates the
risk.26 Even if it is thought, without supporting evidence and as a matter of law,
that children should be deemed to appreciate the risk, there still may be an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the child and
others in marketing slingshots directly to
them.
Entrusting potentially dangerous articles
to a child may pose an unreasonable risk of
harm not only because the child may not
appreciate the risk or may not have the skill

to use the article safely but—even if he
does appreciate the risk and does have the
requisite skill—because he may recklessly
ignore the risk and use the article frivolously due to immaturity of judgment, exuberance of spirit, or sheer bravado.
"One has no right to demand of a child,
or of any other person known to be wanting in ordinary judgment or discretion, a
prudence beyond his years or capacity,
and therefore in his own conduct, where
it may possibly result in injury, a degree
of care is required commensurate to the
apparent immaturity or imbecility that
exposes the other to peril. Thus, a person driving rapidly along a highway
where he sees boys engaged in sports, is
not at liberty to assume that they will
exercise the same discretion in keeping
out of his way that would be exercised by
others; and ordinary care demands of
him that he shall take notice of their
immaturity and govern his action accordingly." 3 Cooley, Law of Torts (4th ed.),
§ 490, pp. 433-434.
[26] Just as the driver of an automobile
is expected to take precautions for the safety of children playing near a highway even
though children can be expected to appreciate the risk and the driver does not know
that the individual children are incompetent
to look after themselves,27 so too a supplier

25. An actor "is required to recognize that his
tions of the Ophthalmological Soc'y U.K. 895,
conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion
897 (1971); Kerby, Eye Accidents to School
of another's interest if a reasonable man would
Children, 20 Sight-Saving Rev. 2 (1950).
do so while exercising (a) such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowl- 27. Reasonable precautions must be taken even
edge of other pertinent matters, intelligence,
though the actor does not know that an individand judgment as a reasonable man would have;
ual child is not competent and the child may
. * * *" Restatement, supra, § 289.
appreciate the risk:
"For the purpose of determining whether the
"And when children are in the vicinity,
actor should recognize that his conduct in? r
much is necessarily to be expected of them
* volves a risk, he is required to know
r/
which would not be looked for on the part of
"(a) the qualities and habits of human bean adult. It may be anticipated that a child
;* ings and animals and the qualities, characterwill dash into the street in the path of a car,
istics, and capacities of things and forces in
so far as they are matters of common knowlor meddle with a turntable. It may be clear
*r edge at the time and in the community." Id.,
negligence to entrust him with a gun, or to
n § 290.
allow him to drive an automobile, or to throw
candy where a crowd of boys will scramble
& There is some evidence that one of the reafor it. There have been a number of 'pied
* sons slingshot injuries are experienced by chilpiper' cases, in which street vendors of ice
* dren between the ages of 5 and 14 in disproporcream, and the like, which attract children
' tion to the populace generally is that the risk is
into the street, have been held liable for fail'"not appreciated. See, Johnston, Perforating
ure to protect them against traffic. It may
Eye Injuries: A Five Year Survey, 91 TransaC254 N.WJd—17
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can be expected in marketing a product to
take precautions for the safety of children
and others even if the child may be expected to appreciate the risk and individual
children may both appreciate it and be
skilled in using the product. It is for a jury
to decide whether any negligence in marketing slingshots directly to children is a
cause in fact of plaintiffs loss.28

utility.
The
Restatement
provide
"Where an act is one which a reasonal
man would recognize as involving a risk
harm to another, the risk is unreasona
and the act is negligent if the risk is of si
magnitude as to outweigh what the 1
regards as the utility of the act or of
particular manner in which it is done/1 ]
statement, supra, § 291.

Ill
Reasonableness of the Risk of Harm
[27] Even if a person recognizes that his
conduct involves a risk of invading another
person's interest, he may nevertheless engage in such conduct unless the risk created
by his conduct is unreasonable.
The reasonableness of the risk depends on
whether its magnitude is outweighed by its
be quite as negligent to leave the gun, or to
leave dynamite caps, where children are likely to come, and can easily find them In all
such cases, the question comes down essentially to one of whether the risk outweighs
the utility of the actor's conduct. He may be
required to guard a power line pole located in
a public park, but not one m the open country; and whether he must take steps to prevent children from interfering with such an
object as a stationary vehicle is entirely a
matter of the circumstances of the particular
case." Prosser, supra, § 33, pp. 172-173.
"In addition, people who have an ordinary
amount of exposure to the facts of modern
life in America will be treated as though they
know many other things. The normal adult
is held to have knowledge of the characteristics of animals common to his community,
such as the proneness of mules to kick, the
viciousness of bulls, and the propensity of
mad dogs to bite. He is also required to be
acquainted with the natural propensities of
children?5 the dangers incident to corn-

[28] The balancing of the magnitude
the risk and the utility of the actor's c
duct requires a consideration by the cc
and jury of the societal interests involve
The issue of negligence may be remo
from jury consideration if the court <
eludes that overriding considerations
public policy require that a particular \
be adopted and applied in all cases.
'? 2d 944 (1945). Compare § 27 5 infra.
Harper & James, supra, § 16.5, pp 912mon sports, and the elements of the wea
to which he is accustomed.
The trier of fact decides whether reasoi
precautions have been taken and thereb
tabhshes the specific standard of care
"The common formula for the 'neglij
standard is the conduct of a reasonable
under like circumstances. In applying
standard under the instructions of the <
the jury normally is expected to dete
what the general standard of conduct i
require in the particular case, and so to
particular standard of its own within th
eral one. This function is commonly s
be one of the determination of a quest
fact, and not of law. It differs rroi
function of the court, however, only in
is not reduced to any definite rules, s
the same conclusion will not necessai
reached in two identical cases, and that
secondary function, performed only afi
court has reached its initial conclusio
the issue is for the jur> " Restateme
pra, § 328 C, Comment on Clause (b

"35 Such as their heedlessness—Femhng
v. Star Publication Co., 195 Wash 395, 81 28. A jury might conclude that because th
P.2d 293 (1938); the attractiveness of ponds
was skilled in the use of a slingshot and
of water—Davoren v. Kansas City, 308 Mo.
use it frivolously, the manner of market
513, 273 S.W. 401, 40 AX R. 473 (1925), the
slingshot was not the cause m fact of pU
attractiveness of dangerous objects such as
injury.
explosives—Wellman v. Fordson Coal Co.,
105 W.Va. 463, 143 S.E. 160 (1928), childish 29. "Conduct is not negligent unless the
impulses—Louisville & N. R. Co v. Vaughn, tude of the nsk involved therein so out
its utility as to make the nsk unreas
292 Ky. 120, 166 S.W.2d 43 (1943), climbing
Therefore, one relying upon neghgenc
propensity—Beaton's Administrator v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 291 Ky. cause of action or defense must convu
court and jury that this is the case." F
304, 164 S.W.2d 468 (1942); propensity of
ment, supra, § 291, Comment b, p. 55 (
small children to wander into streets—Agdeppa v. Glougie, 71 Cal.App2d 463, 162
sis supplied).
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A court would thus refuse to allow a jury
to consider whether an automobile manufacturer should be liable for all injuries
resulting from manufacturing automobiles
on the theory that it is foreseeable that
some 50,000 persons may be killed and hundreds of thousands injured every year as a
result of manufacturing automobiles. The
utility of providing automobile transportation is deemed by society to override the
magnitude of the risk created by their manufacture. Similarly, a court might conclude
that it would be violative of public policy to
hold a manufacturer of slingshots liable for
all injuries resulting from their use. The
interest of mature persons who wish to
purchase and use slingshots might be
deemed to supersede the interest of those
who may be harmed by their careless or
improper use.
The issue in the instant case is not whether slingshots should be manufactured, but
the narrower question of whether marketing slingshots directly to children creates an
mreasonable risk of harm. In determining
;hat question, the Court must first ask
whether the utility of marketing slingshots
lirectly to children so overrides the risk
hereby created as to justify the Court in
efusing to permit juries to subject persons
yho engage in such conduct to liability for
he resulting harm. If it concludes that the
tility does not, as a matter of law, override
he risk, then the question of balancing
tility and risk is for the jury to decide,
gain, as part of its consideration of the
sasonableness of defendants' conduct, unss the Court concludes that all reasonable
). Projections from one study indicate that
nearly 66,000 school children in the United
States during any 9-month school year suffer
injuries to the eye. Over 4% of the reported
injuries in a study carried out in Louisville
were caused by slingshots and other weapons.
Such instrumentalities were responsible for
17% of the more serious injuries. Kerby, su?ra, 20 Sight Saving Rev., pp. 3-4, 11.
Another study shows that "[tjhere were an
estimated 471 injuries related to slingshots and
ling propelled toys during the period July 1,
974-July 30, 1975, treated in United States
tospital emergency rooms, all but 2 of which
/ere head or eye injuries to victims under 15
ears of age." U. S. Consumer Product Safety
ommission, Bureau of Epidemiology, Special

persons would be of one mind on that question.
The Restatement suggests a number of
factors that should be considered in balancing the utility of the actor's conduct and
the magnitude of the risk. First, the magnitude of the risk:
"In determining the magnitude of the
risk for the purpose of determining
whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are important:
"(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled;
"(b) the extent of the chance that the
actor's conduct will cause an invasion of
any interest of the other or of one of a
class of which the other is a member;
"(c) the extent of the harm likely to be
caused to the interests imperiled;
"(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk
takes effect in harm." Restatement, supra, § 293.
a) The law attaches a high social value to
the interest of persons in unimpaired eyesight.
b) Slingshots are potentially dangerous.
An expert witness, called by Moning, testified that the slingshots Alfono purchased
were capable of launching projectiles at
speeds exceeding 350 miles per hour. Slingshots cause hundreds of serious injuries
each year to school age children. Almost
all these injuries are head or eye injuries
and occur to children 5 to 14.30 Experience
Report: Injuries Associated with Products
Which Have Projectiles (Draft, October 23,
1975), p. 15. During the same time period,
2,120 injuries reported to hospital emergency
rooms involved projectile products. Id., p. 17.
The U. S. Consumer Product Safety Commission states that since "[s]lingshots range from
toys to hunting models capable of killing small
game * * * it is recommended that high
powered slingshots be sold only to persons
over 20 years of age." Id., p. 23. The Commission concluded that "[o]verall, projectile products include a diverse array of products which
while they share a common hazard are very
different in age of users, intended use, and
likelihood and consequences of misuse," and
that therefore "Commission action would be
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therefore shows that marketing slingshots
to children may with substantial frequency
cause an invasion of the interest in unimpaired eyesight of a substantial number of
persons.
c) The extent of the harm likely to be
caused to the interest so imperiled may be
of a most serious nature.
d) The number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded is difficult to
estimate, but it appears that hundreds of
injuries, many resulting in serious impairment of vision, occur every year as a result
of the use of slingshots by children.31
Turning to utility:
"In determining what the law regards
as the utility of the actor's conduct for
the purpose of determining whether the
actor is negligent, the following factors
are important:
"(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or protected by the conduct;
"(b) the extent of the chance that this
interest will be advanced or protected by
the particular course of conduct;
"(c) the extent of the chance that such
interest can be adequately advanced or
protected by another and less dangerous
course of conduct." Restatement 2d,
Torts, § 292.
most effective" "in the area of toy guns and
other toy weapons with projectiles and slingshots." Id.
31. See fn. 30, supra, and accompanying text.
32. The United States Supreme Court, relying
on state statutes providing for wrongful death
actions and overruling cases to the contrary,
held that under general maritime law there was
a cause of action for wrongful death.
State courts created an action for wrongful
death in admiralty cases, based on statutes not,
by their terms, applicable to maritime cases.
In that context, judges were "awake to the
purport of this legislative movement, eagerly
seized upon principles derivable from 'natural
equity' and 'consonant * * * with the benign spirit of English and American legislation
on the subject' to mould admiralty law to conform with the trend of civilized thought." Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, Harv.Legal Essays 213, 226 (1934). Several state
courts have relied on statutes in other jurisdic-

a) There is a sharp difference of opinion
concerning the social value of the child's
interest in having direct-market access to
slingshots. The view that slingshots should
not be sold or used by children is widely
held and is reflected in statutes and ordinances prohibiting the sale of slingshots tc
or their use by minors.
[29] Statutes and other legislative judgments may themselves be a source of common law. "This legislative establishment oJ
policy carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes in
volved. The policy thus established has be
come itself a part of our law, to be given iti
appropriate weight not only in matters o
statutory construction but also in those o
decisional law." Moragne v. States Marin
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390-391, 90 S.Ct. 1772
1782,.26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970).32 Similarly, se
Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 14, 26--2S
215 N.W.2d 149 (1974).33
North Carolina and Mississippi prohibi
sale of a slingshot to a minor.34 Id ah
prohibits sale to a minor under 16 withoi
parental consent.35 Mississippi holds a h
ther liable for allowing a son under 16 1
have, own or carry concealed a slingshot.
Pennsylvania prohibits sale to and carryiii
by persons under 18 of an implemei
"which impels a pellet of any kind with
force that can reasonably be expected 1
tions as "the wiser and safer rule," notwit
standing local common law to the contrary,
holding that a general devise operates to ex
cute a power of appointment vested in tl
testator. Id., p. 231.
Legislative judgments or trends and statuto
changes may be relevant in assessing the "r
tional conscience" in common law and cons
tutional adjudication. See Furman v. Georg
408 U.S. 238, 298-299, 92 S.Ct. 2726,
L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Brennan, J., concumn
33. In extending the obligation of an abstract
to persons not in privity of contract, this Coi
relied in part on statutes of other jurisdictic
so providing.
34. N.CGen.Stat. § 14-315; Miss.Code A
§ 97-37-13.
35. Idaho Code § 18-3302.
36. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-37-15.
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cause bodily harm".37 Nine states prohibit
any person from carrying a concealed slingshot 38 A number of states consider slingshots to be deadly weapons and treat them
under statutes prohibiting carrying concealed weapons.39 Many cities regulate the
sale and possession of slingshots.40
Michigan empowers fourth class cities to
'prohibit and punish the use of toy pistols,
iling shots and other dangerous toys or
mplements within the city" (emphasis sup>lied).41 Nine cities in this state prohibit
>ersons from possessing slingshots,42 five
>thers prohibit possession by or sale to miiors.43 Those ordinances generally classify
lingshots as "dangerous weapons."44
It is apparent from the legislation in othr states and innumerable municipalities
hat all reasonable persons do not agree
lat marketing slingshots directly to chilren does not involve an unreasonable risk
f harm. The failure of other states and
ties to enact like statutes and ordinances,
id of the Legislature either to authorize or
•ohibit the marketing of slingshots direct'. Pa.Stat.Ann., title 18, § 6304 (Purdon).
. Alas.Stat.Ann. § 11.55.010; Idaho Code
§ 18-3302; Miss.Code Ann. § 97-37-1; Mont.
Rev.Codes Ann. § 94-3525; Tenn.Code Ann.
5 39-4901; Utah Code Ann. § 76-23-4; N.C.
3en.Stat. § 14-269; S.C.Code § 16-23-460;
U.Gen.Laws § 11-47-42.
Alas.Stat.Ann. § 11.55.010 (treated, along
vith pistols,firearmsand daggers, under carryrig concealed weapons statute); Del.Code
ton., title 11, § 222(5) (defined to be a "deadly
weapon"); D.C.Code Ann. § 22-3217 ("dangerous article"); Idaho Code § 18-3302 (treated
rith "concealed and dangerous weapons");
id.Code Ann. § 35-1-79-1 (Burns) ("dangerus weapon"); Mass Laws Ann., ch. 269, § 12
sale prohibited, along with switch knife, sword
ane, bludgeon and blackjack); Miss.Code
nn. § 97-37-1 ("deadly weapon"); Mont.Rev.
odes Ann. § 94-3525 ("deadly weapon"); N.J.
tat.Ann. §§ 2A:151-2, 2A:151-5 (West)
weapon," "dangerous instrument"); N.C.
en.Stat. § 14-269 ("deadly weapon"); S.C.
3de § 16-23-460 ("deadly weapon"); Tenn.
xie Ann. § 39-4901 ("dangerous weapon");
tan Code Ann. § 76-23-4 ("deadly weapon").
« Ga,Code Ann. § 26-2901, committee notes,
201.

39 Fed.Reg. 16707-16710 (1974).
M.C.L.A. § 91.1; M.S.A. § 5.1740.

ly to children, indicates a variety of opinion,
but not a consensus regarding the reasonableness of marketing slingshots directly to
children.
b) Children are more likely to obtain
slingshots if they are marketed directly to
them.
c) Slingshots could be marketed in a
manner designed to confine sale to adults
and to exclude purchases by children. Instead of manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers effectively determining whether
children shall have slingshots, an adult who
generally would know the child would decide whether he is of sufficient maturity to
have one; the adult would, under the common law, assume responsibility for any negligence on his part in entrusting a slingshot
to the child.
Having in mind the parent's interest in
protecting the child from potentially dangerous instrumentalities45 and in avoiding
exposure to litigation such as befell the
Alfonos, the child's interest in an opportuniHome-rule cities possess the police power
and thus there is no need for specific enabling
legislation. M.C.L.A. § 117.3; M.S.A. § 5.2073.
42. Belding ordinances, § 12.11; Buchanan ordinances, § 11.4; Center Line ordinances, § 8108; Escanaba ordinances, § (D); Grand Haven
ordinances, § 8-209; Hazel Park ordinances,
§ 15; Sterling Heights ordinances, § 7.(1);
Trenton ordinances, § 9.171, and Warren ordinances, § 8-210. See 39 Fed.Reg. 16708-16710
(1974).
43. Gladstone ordinances, § 504.06 (prohibits
possession, sale, or gift to persons younger
than 18); Lake Orion ordinances, § 9 (prohibits
sale, offer to sale, give away or distribute to
persons under the age of 21); Port Huron ordinances, § 9.117 (prohibits parents to knowingly
permit child under 18 to use or possess except
under adult supervision); Waterford ordinances, § 61-IX (prohibits possession, sale or
gift to persons younger than 21); Royal Oak
ordinances, § 276.1(c) (prohibits selling or giving to persons under 16). See 39 Fed.Reg.
16707-16710 (1974).
44. See 39 Fed.Reg., supra.
45. See generally 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent and
Child, § 106, p. 205 et seq.; Prosser, supra,
§ 125, p. 888 et seq.
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ty to use slingshots cannot be said as a
matter of law to be inadequately advanced
or protected by allowing a jury to decide
that a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer
is negligent in marketing them directly to
children.
[30] Balancing the magnitude of the
risk and the utility of the conduct in the
application of the factors suggested by the
Restatement, there is not a sufficient basis
for concluding as a matter of law that the
utility of the defendants' conduct outweighs
the risk of harm thereby created. The
sharp difference of opinion regarding the
balancing of utility and risk of harm requires submission of these questions for
jury assessment as part of its consideration
of the reasonableness of the risk of harm
and of defendants' conduct.
[31] While "slingshots have a long history of association with the human race" and
have been used for hundreds of years by
both adults and children, the common law is
not immutable, unable to respond to
changes in society and technology.
"The customary usage and practice of the
industry is relevant evidence to be used
in determining whether or not this standard [of reasonably prudent conduct] has
been met. Such usage cannot, however,
be determinative of the standard. As
stated by Justice Holmes:
" 'What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what
ought to be done is fixed by a standard of
reasonable prudence, whether it usually is
complied with or not.' Texas and Pacific
R. Co. v. Behymer (1903), 189 U.S. 468,
470, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905." Marietta
v. Cliffs Ridge, Inc., 385 Mich. 364, 369370, 189 N.W.2d 208, 209 (1971).
46. A slingshot is no more a toy than a sparkler,
fireworks, an air gun or an empty cigarette
lighter, yet courts have sustained liability for
the entrustment of such articles to children.
See fn. 24, supra. Books prepared for parents
speak of the dangers of such "toys." See, e. g.,
Swartz, Toys That Don't Care (Gambit, Inc.,
1971), p. 251. The toy industry has acknowledged its awareness of the nsks; the industry's
proposed draft of Voluntary Product Standards
for Toy Safety (May, 1972), while excluding
slingshots from coverage, states that there are

As society becomes increasingly urbanized and access to open space decreases, the
law responds and develops.
Modern technology may have magnified
the risk of ricochet and of injury to persons
not in the immediate range or direction in
which the slingshot is aimed. Slingshots
capable of firing projectiles at 350 miles per
hour may be a far cry from those historically made by children from rubber bands and
household paraphernalia.
Nor does calling a slingshot a "toy" make
it any less dangerous nor immunize its mar
keting directly to children from the genera
rules of negligence liability.46
There is a qualitative difference betweei
slingshots and other projectile "toys" on th
one hand, and baseball equipment and bicj
cles-on the other. The latter are viewed b
society essentially as are automobiles i
that although children are injured an
killed riding bicycles and playing basebal
the utility of such activity is regarded I
society and all reasonable persons as ou
weighing the risk of harm created by the
manufacture for and marketing to childre
Statutes and ordinances do not prohibit t1
purchase or use of bicycles or baseb;
equipment by children. There is no ong
ing debate, as there is about slingsho
whether children should have direct marl
access to bicycles or baseball equipme
In sum, it cannot be said that there v
no "obligation of reasonable conduct for 1
benefit of the plaintiff",47 or that all r
sonable men would agree that defendar
conduct was not "a substantial factor
producing the result" 48 or regarding "
foreseeability of [the] particular risk"49
regarding "the reasonableness of the
"[c]ertam well-recognized hazards inheiren
such traditional toys as bows and arrc
slingshots and darts," quoted in Swartz, Bi
ness in the Toy Box, 43 Sight Saving Pev
97 (1973).
47. Prosser, supra, § 45, pp. 289-290.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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fendants* conduct with respect to it, or the
normal character of [Alfono's conduct]"50
as an intervening cause.
Since reasonable persons can differ regarding the balance of risk and utility (the
reasonableness of the risk of harm) and
since there is no overriding policy based on
social utility of maintaining absolute access
to slingshots by children, we reverse and
remand for a new trial
KAVANAGH, C. J., and WILLIAMS, J.,
concur.
RYAN and MOODY, JJ., not participating.
FITZGERALD, Justice.
This appeal concerns the propriety of a
trial court's grant of directed verdict in
favor of defendants, the manufacturer,
wholesaler, and retailers of a slingshot, in
an action brought by plaintiff to recover for
injuries sustained as a result of use of the
slingshot.
Evidence introduced at trial indicated
that on August 17,1967, Joseph Alfono, age
11, purchased two ten-cent slingshots from
defendant Campbell Discount Jewelry. He
gave one of the slingshots to plaintiff, age
12, and the boys rode their bicycles to a
nearby park. At the park plaintiff and
Joseph Alfono employed their slingshots to
shoot projectiles at frogs which they found
in the vicinity of a pond. The incident of
injury occurred when plaintiff was standing
near the small pond and Joseph was on the
side of a nearby hill. Joseph called to plaintiff to look up and watch as Joseph shot at
a bird. When plaintiff looked up, he was
struck in the left eye by a projectile from
Joseph's slingshot. Evidence introduced at
trial indicated that the injuring slingshot
was manufactured by Chemical Sundries,
Inc.,1 and distributed by King Tobacco and
Grocery Co.
50. id.
1. After commencement of this litigation the
name of defendant was changed to Chemtoy
Corporation.
2. The Alfonos are party to a cross-appeal concerning their respective rights against the other

//£

Settlement was agreed upon between
plaintiff and defendant Alfonos with the
result that the Alfonos were only nominal
parties to the litigation.2 The trial court,
upon motion of the remaining defendants
after presentation of plaintiff's proofs,
granted directed verdict in favor of defendants, opining that defendants owed plaintiff
no legal duty upon which recovery could be
premised and that defendants' conduct was
not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed in an
unpublished per curiam opinion. We granted leave to appeal.
We would affirm the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, concluding defendants
did not owe plaintiff minor the asserted
duty not to manufacture, distribute and sell
slingshots.
I
Prosser, in his treatise on the law of
torts, offers the following analysis of the
role of the court and jury respecting the
question of whether a legal duty is owed by
one party to another:
"3. The existence of a duty. In other
words, whether, upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the
parties that the community will impose a
legal obligation upon one for the benefit
of the other—or, more simply, whether
the interest of the plaintiff which has
suffered invasion was entitled to legal
protection at the hands of the defendant.
This is entirely a question of law, to be
determined by reference to the body of
statutes, rules, principles and precedents
which make up the law; and it must be
determined only by the court. It is no
part of the province of a jury to decide
whether a manufacturer of goods is under any obligation for the safety of the
defendants in the event this Court were to set
aside the directed verdict entered by the tnal
court.
3. The tnal court's extensive opinion was issued
from the bench and evidences thorough consideration of the case before that court.
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ultimate consumer, * * *. A decision
"(1) the inherently dangerous m
by the court that, upon any version of the
of the slingshot, and (2) the youthfu
facts, there is no duty, must necessarily
and lack of discretion of the purchaj
result in judgment for the defendant."
The question before us is not settle
(Emphasis supplied.) Prosser, Torts (4th
Michigan
case law precedent. A re
Ed.), § 37, p. 206.
question was considered by this Court,
Decisions of this Court have in similar ever, in Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich
fashion recognized that the question of duty
50 N.W. 135 (1891). In Chaddock, a
is to be resolved by the court rather than
gun case, this Court affirmed a dir
the jury. See Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co.,
Inc., 383 Mich. 158,162,174 N.W.2d 752, 754 verdict in favor of the father-purchai
(1970), in which the Court viewed summary an air gun used by a neighbor boy in i
judgment for defendant manufacturer of a ous fashion. Evidence indicated the
wire milk bottle carrier proper after deter- er, rather than the father, was in "co
mination that there was "no legal duty to of the premises at the time the gui
supply a carrier so designed as to prevent loaned to and used by the visiting
bottles placed therein from breaking when Negligence of the mother was not ass
dropped to a hard surface". Also, see JSo- The court concluded:
nin v. Gralewicz, 378 Mich. 521, 527, 146
"It was not negligence per se i
N.W.2d 647 (1966).
defendant to buy this toy gun, and
The trial court in this case found no legal
it in the hands of the boy nine ye
duty owed plaintiff by defendants. We
age; and there were too many int
now review—as a question of law—that
ing causes without the act or kno^
determination.
, of the defendant, between the buj
the gun and the injury to hold t
II
fendant liable for its use in this CJ
During the course of proceedings below
his own son had in any manner cor
plaintiff has alleged that the defendants
ed to the accident, a different q
violated numerous duties4 which attached
would arise, upon which I expr
liability. Through the sifting and winnowopinion." supra, 230, 50 N.W. 13
ing action of the trial and appellate process
Whalen v. Bennett, 4 Mich.App.
these allegations have been refined so that
we have presently before us only the fol- N.W.2d 797 (1966), involved the .
lowing contention as stated at page 11 of stance of injury which occurred wl
fendant's son shot an air gun while
plaintiff's brief:
"Plaintiff's position [is] that the de- with friends and injured one of 5his c
fendants had a duty as reasonably pru- ions. The Court of Appeals , co
dent manufacturers, distributors and re- that the trial court's grant of si
tail merchants not to manufacture, mar- judgment was improper, there bei
ket and sell these slingshots to young dence indicating that a duty on the
the parent, to supervise the use o:
children."
It is asserted that two factors give rise to strumentality as dangerous as an
had been breached.6 Neither Chadt
this duty:
4. Among these duties was the duty to warn
plaintiff purchaser of the dangerous propensities of a slingshot either by personal notification as in the case of a retailer or by printed
notice as in the case of the wholesaler and
manufacturer. Other courts have uniformly rejected a duty to warn when confronted with
products, like the slingshot, the dangerous propensities of which are well known. See, e. g.,
Pitts v. Basile, 35 I11.2d 49, 219 N.E.2d 472
(1966), and Morris v. Toy Box, 204 Cal.App.2d

468, 22 Cal.Rptr. 572 (1962). See, al
ser, Torts (4th Ed.), § 96, p. 649.
5. Justice Fitzgerald authored the opin
sitting as a judge of the Court of
6. See for an analogous holding, which
ally discusses application of Res tat
Torts Second, § 390, discussed infi
Fredericks v. General Motors Corp.,
App. 580, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973).
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Whalen dealt with the liability of retailers,
wholesalers, or manufacturers.7
Cases from other jurisdictions offer instruction not afforded by Michigan precedent. In Pitts v. Basile, 35 I11.2d 49, 219
N.E.2d 472 (1966), a child struck by a dart
thrown by another child brought suit
against the wholesaler of the dart and the
retailer from whom the darts had been purchased. The appeal considered only the
question of the wholesalers liability. The
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that there
was insufficient causal connection between
alleged negligence on the part of the wholesaler and resulting injury, finding that
there was no relation between the marketing of the darts and subsequent injury. In
addition, the Court commented:
"We are not concerned in this case with
the liability of the proprietors of the grocery store who sold the darts to the eightyear-old boy, but with the liability of the
defendant [wholesaler], who sold the
darts to the proprietors of the grocery
store. There was no contention or proof
that the darts were in any way defective,
and the appellate court emphasized that
it was not characterizing them as 'inherently dangerous/ In this court, however,
the plaintiff urges that the defendants
4
"non-defective" dart manifestly was not
safe when used by small children for the
purpose for which it was intended. The
dart in question was intended to be
thrown at various objects * * *. Its
propensity to cause serious injury, particularly to the eyes, was demonstrated by
the very injury suffered by the infant
plaintiff in the instant case/
"There are many things used by children that may be said to be unsafe when
7. Plaintiff also asserts that Crowther v Ross
Chemical & Manufacturing Co, 42 MichApp
426, 202 N W 2d 577 (1972), is a case in point
This action was brought to recover for the
wrongful death of two young girls who were
killed by a man who had allegedly been sniffing
glue manufactured by defendant The Court of
Appeals concluded that the trial court's grant
of summary judgment was inappropriate because
"It is an issue of fact whether, as plaintiff
alleges in his complaint, the practice of glue

used for the purpose for which they are
intended. A baseball, a baseball bat, a
penknife, a Boy Scout hatchet, a bicycle,
all have the capacity to injure the user or
others in the course of their normal use.
They are not, however, to be categorized
as 'dangerous instrumentalities/ As was
said by the Tennessee court in Highsaw
v Creech, 17 Tenn.App. 573, 69 S.W.2d
249, 252 [1934], 'an air gun is not a dangerous instrumentality of itself, but is in
fact a toy. * * * The fact alone that
an injury may be inflicted by such a toy
does not make of it a dangerous instrumentality in the sense that the term is
generally used/ In Morris v. Toy Box
(1962), 204 Cal.App.2d 468, 22 Cal.Rptr.
572, 574-575, a complaint brought by a
minor against a retailer alleging that the
retailer knew that the intended user of a
bow and arrow was the purchaser's tenyear-old boy was dismissed, the court saying, 'the bow and arrow has been in use
by young and old alike for thousands of
years. * * * To us it is simply inconceivable that a 10-year-old boy, much less
his mother, would be unacquainted with
the use of so common an article as the
one here in question/ See also, White v.
Page (Ohio App 1950), 105 N.E.2d 652."
supra, 35 I11.2d 49, 51-52; 219 N.E.2d 472,
473, 474.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Atkins v. Arlan's Department Store of Norman, 522 P.2d 1020 (Okl.1974), quoted the
above from Pitts v. Basile in concluding
that there was no cause of action for plaintiff against the manufacturer and retailer
of a lawn dart game for injury caused when
a lawn dart struck the eye of a child. That
court concluded:
sniffing was, at this time, sufficiently notorious
that defendant knew or should have known this
was an alternative use for its product"
In Crowther, however, summary judgment on
the pleadings alone was involved Here we
have a directed verdict granted after plaintiff
has presented all his proofs The thrust of
decision in Crowther was that plaintiff be given
an opportunity to present proofs In the
present case plaintiff enjoyed such opportunity
Crowther is therefore not of decisional significance to the case before us.
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"There are many toys and playthings,
perfectly harmless and inoffensive in
themselves, but whose common use can
be perverted into a dangerous use and
design, and there are very few of the
most harmless toys which cannot be used
to injure another. The dart's propensities to cause injury is demonstrated by
the injury sustained but the fact that an
injury was sustained does not necessarily
mean that the manufacturer or retailer
are liable for those injuries.
*
*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff refers us to § 390 of the ]
statement of Torts, 2d, indicating that t
section affords a basis for liability. T
section states:
"One who supplies directly or throi
a third person a chattel for the use
another whom the supplier knows or
reason to know to be likely because of
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to
it in a manner involving unreasons
risk of physical harm to himself and <
ers whom the supplier should expecl
share in or be endangered by its us<
subject to liability for physical harm
suiting to them."
The dart in question was not designed
A
similar contention was rejected by
or manufactured to be thrown at an indiCalifornia
Court of Appeals in Bojorqut
vidual but at a plastic ring or another
House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal.App.3d 930,
target." supra, 1022.
133 Cal.Rptr. 483, 484 (1976), with the
In Morris v. Toy Box, 204 Cal.App.2d 468,
lowing remarks.
22 Cal.Rptr. 572 (1962), the Second District
"A ten cent slingshot is a toy althc
Court of Appeals of California faced the
its
use, like the use of other toys, sue
allegation of plaintiff that the retailer of a
baseball bats and bows and arrows,
bow and arrow was liable for injuries suscause injury to others. The cases
tained by a child who had been struck by an
have found under section 390 and
arrow shot by the son of the buyer of the
illustrations provided in the Restate]
bow and arrow. The California court reall involve the sale or entrustment
jected the notion that a bow and arrow
chattel to a particular individual wh
8
were "inherently dangerous", and comlegedly was known to the seller to b
mented:
young,
inexperienced or incompetei
"As in the case of a slingshot,9 the bow
use the item properly.
and arrow has been in use by young and
"Here [plaintiff] wants us to hol<
old alike for thousands of years; its
retailer and distributor negligent for
method of operation, therefore, is a mating toy slingshots to the class of pe
ter so notorious to all that production of
for whom they were intended
evidence relative thereto would be unnecyoung; in effect, she asks us to ba
essary * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)
sale of toy slingshots by judicial
supra, 472, 22 Cal.Rptr. 574.
Such a limitation is within the purvi
the Legislature, not the judiciary."
The court concluded there was no duty on
the part of the retailer to warn of the The illustrations to the Restatement
dangers incident to the bow and arrows' use cate that that section was intended to
when knowledge of an individual's ci
and found no cause of action.10
8. The talismanic label "inherently dangerous"
attained significance because a finding of "inherent dangerousness" avoided the privity requirement of contract law subjecting the
wholesaler, manufacturer or retailer to liability
in tort. Plaintiffs complaint is framed in terms
of negligence. The doctrine of "inherent dangerousness" is not of decisional significance to
the case at hand.
9. The California court at this point footnotes
the following:

"'And David prevailed over the Phi
with a sling and a stone, and he stnic
slew the Philistine.' (1 Kings 17.50)"
10. The New Jersey Superior Court si
commented that a plastic slingshot wai
dangerous instrumentality in Levis v Z
72 N.J.Super. 168, 178 A.2d 44 (1962),
involving injury sustained as a result c
fective slingshot.
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stances indicates to the supplier reasonable
likelihood that the individual supplied is
incompetent to use the chattel supplied and
may therefore cause harm to himself and
others. Plaintiff in this case seeks an extension of the Restatement doctrine to recognize the status of children, rather than
circumstances concerning an individual
child, and in relation thereto to circumscribe with duty the distribution of toys,
the misuse of which involves a likelihood of
injury—f. e., here, slingshots.
Ill
In our view we are being asked to perform a legislative task. If we were to find
a duty on the part of defendants not to
supply slingshots to children, we would in
effect be making a value judgment and
saying to defendants and their counterparts
that such—in this instance—toys should not
be manufactured or marketed.
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Action was brought against realty company by prospective purchaser for return of
deposit made to company toward purchase
of real estate, and realty company counterclaimed for its full commission plus $10,200.
The Macomb County Circuit Court, George
R. Deneweth, J., granted realty company
As has been noted, slingshots have a long summary judgment for full amount of its
history of association with the human race. counterclaim, and appeal was taken. The
Indeed, anyone can make one from a tree Court of Appeals, R. B. Burns, J., held that:
branch and a piece of inner tube. We ac- (1) realty company was bound by its obligaknowledge that there are dangers incident tions to vendor to submit any offers it
to their use and that such dangers are mag- received to vendor irrespective of irrevocanified when slingshots are used by minors. bility clause in its contract with prospective
In the case of use by a minor, the law purchaser, and (2) realty company's promise
recognizes that parents have some responsi- to exert effort to obtain vendor's approval
bility of supervision. See, e. g., Whalen v. of prospective purchaser's offer was an unBennett, supra. Cf. Chaddock v. Plummer, enforceable promise and did not constitute,
consideration to support irrevocability
supra.
In the absence of legislative prescription clause by which prospective purchaser's ofcircumscribing the manufacture, distribu- fer was purportedly made irrevocable for
tion, or sale of slingshots or providing that 15-day period.
defendants insure against the misuse of
Reversed and remanded.
their products, we are unable to find a duty
upon which the liability of defendants may
1. Brokers <s=»32
be premised.
Realty company was bound by its obliWe would affirm.
gations to vendor to submit any offers it
received to vendor irrespective of irrevocaCOLEMAN, J., concurs.
bility clause in realty company's contract
with prospective purchaser, by which prospective purchaser's offer was purportedly
( O I KEY NUMBER: SYSTEM)
SYSTEM}
made irrevocable for 15-day period in exchange for realty company's promise to exert effort to obtain vendor's approval of
such offer, and it would have been breach

